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 Consumers frequently experience difficulty regulating behavior to achieve goals like 
eating well, exercising, and saving money. Research has shown that implementation intentions – 
plans connecting situational cues and desired behaviors – are a useful tool to bridge the gap 
between one’s intentions and actions. However, recent work has also revealed that plans 
sometimes have null or deleterious effects, reducing goal achievement and possibly 
misallocating resources spent on pursuing ineffectual plans. Thus, it is important to understand 
the psychological processes and contexts that contribute to helpful (and not-so-helpful) plans. 
 In Chapter 1, I investigate processes that drive the effects of planning over time. I 
approach this question in two ways. First, the existing literature employs many ways of eliciting 
plans, yet relatively little work has examined how these may be the same or different from when 
individuals do not set plans. I show that how a plan is elicited changes the means which are 
focused upon: i.e., facilitative steps to reach a go l versus thinking about coping with obstacles. 
Second, I unpack a seemingly null X-Y effect of planning to reveal that changes in plan format 
influence intentions and action through indirect processes. In two field contexts, I demonstrate 
that if-then plans focused on obstacle-coping facilit te negative performance evaluations, 
producing changes in regret, outcome expectancies, and future performance. Experience further 
moderates the link between regret and outcome expectancies. 
 In Chapter 2, I study how planning influences forecasts. Planning and prediction are 
closely related; both involve trying to anticipate th  presence and impact of future events. 





by constructing narratives of the future that do not consider barriers. Thus, do plans which 
encourage elaboration of ways to cope with obstacles change forecasts? To answer this question, 
I examine three types of predictions – future situat ons/actions, task durations, and anticipated 
emotions, and find mixed results for these contexts.  
  Together, these findings contribute to our understanding of the mechanisms that drive 
planning and lead to the generation of theoretical and practical recommendations to improve the 






PLAN TYPES AND PROCESSES UNDERLYING PLANNING OVER T IME 
INTRODUCTION 
Consumers often struggle with how to translate their d cisions into consistent and 
sustained action – ask nearly anyone who has made a New Year’s resolution to get to the gym, 
eat fewer sweets, save for a rainy day, or kick a smoking habit. Advertisers, real estate agents 
and salespeople are also acutely aware of the maddening difficulties posed by consumers who 
fully intend to buy but procrastinate, forget, or get distracted before the deal is done. 
 These failures to implement decisions have substantial economic and consumer welfare 
consequences. Two-thirds of Americans report that they ry to control their weight through 
dieting, but only 20% are able to keep the pounds off, fueling an obesity epidemic that costs the 
United States an estimated $147 billion per year in medical costs (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Loyola 
University Health System 2013). Over half of Americans in a recent survey reported that they are 
not confident that they will have saved enough money to retire comfortably, with one-third 
expecting that they will need to work into their eighties (Wells Fargo & Company 2012). 
Although many smokers express a desire to quit, only e-third actually attempt to do so each 
year, and 75-80% of those who try relapse within 6 months (Zhou et al. 2009). In these and many 
other contexts, turning intentions into long-term actions has the potential to make consumers 
happier and healthier, and companies – consider firms like Weight Watchers whose business 





Implementation intentions – simple plans that bridge the gap between intentions and 
action – have been proposed as an effective way for consumers to more successfully regulate 
their behavior (Bagozzi and Dholakia 1999; Gollwitzer 1999; Gollwitzer and Sheeran 2009). 
Implementation intentions specify the means for an individual to pursue a goal. For instance, a 
set of implementation intentions for a goal to visit the gym might include laying out a specific 
time to work out such as when one leaves the office in the evening, or outlining obstacles that 
need to be overcome, such as forgetting to bring workout gear.  
Many studies have demonstrated that implementation inte tions improve the likelihood 
of goal achievement in a wide variety of settings by increasing the cognitive accessibility of 
anticipated goal-consistent situations and linking those situations to pre-deliberated actions. 
Thus, implementation intentions help individuals to be better at recognizing times when they 
should act, and prompt more immediate action by eliminating the need to deliberate “in the 
moment” over what to do (for a comprehensive review of the construct, see Gollwitzer 1999). A 
recent meta-analysis of 94 studies yielded a medium-to-large effect size in domains ranging from 
simple reaction time studies in the lab to field inquiries designed to increase cancer screenings 
and self-examinations (Gollwitzer and Sheeran 2006). Indeed, at first glance, implementation 
intentions seem to represent an easy-to-use and consiste t way to help consumers translate their 
best intentions to regulate consumption, saving, and spending into positive results. 
Yet, recent work has revealed a more complex story behind these simple plans; 
sometimes implementation intentions can have no effect or can even backfire, making goal 
achievement less likely. In a large field study of exercise behavior, Skår et al. (2011) found no 
beneficial effects of implementation intentions on self-reported physical activity or observed 





implementation intentions can prompt goal disengagement when individuals are far from 
achieving their goals, because making a plan makes the difficult road ahead more concrete, 
causing a general sense of emotional distress. Similarly, when individuals are focused on 
multiple goals rather than just a single objective, having a concrete plan highlights the difficulty 
of balancing competing priorities and carrying out all the necessary activities to do so (Dalton 
and Spiller 2012). Finally, when planners are in a concrete mindset (versus in an abstract one), 
plans reduce the likelihood that individuals will take advantage of goal-consistent actions that 
fall outside of their plans (Bayuk, Janiszewski, and Leboeuf 2010). These findings and others 
(see also Soman and Cheema 2004; Ülkümen and Cheema 2011) suggest that plans might best 
be approached with caution, particularly in complex “r al world” situations outside the lab where 
people must contend with multiple, competing goals and numerous obstacles that arise over time. 
Yet, these complex situations are often exactly the typ s of circumstances that matter a great deal 
to solving problems that worry consumer behavior researchers and marketing practitioners. 
Thus, while implementation intentions seem to represent a promising tool for consumers 
to better regulate their behavior (and for smart marketers to help them to do it), both academic 
theory and marketing practice would benefit from a deeper understanding of factors that can 
drive plans to succeed or fail. Revealing processes that undermine efforts to use implementation 
intentions should allow for more consistent uses of planning in a wider variety of settings, and 
foster more optimal use of resources like time and money that might otherwise be squandered on 
ineffective plans. In this paper, we make two contributions designed to add to this understanding. 
First, the planning literature has grouped many varied types of interventions under the 
umbrella of “implementation intentions,” but relatively little work has examined whether 





effects. We demonstrate that planning techniques ar not interchangeable. Asking participants to 
form plans using two commonly-used prompts – “if-then plans” and “when-where-how” plans – 
leads them to differentially focus on coping plans to overcome obstacles or step plans to detail 
facilitative actions to get from “point A to point B.” Thus, how we ask the question matters – 
different ways of planning yield considerations about means to approach the goal. 
Second, we examine whether these differences in thought content give rise to 
psychological processes that can contribute to a better understanding of why plans are sometimes 
effective and sometimes ineffective. In two field studies with real, consequential goals, we 
contrast coping-focused and step-focused interventions against a no-plan control condition. We 
show that coping plans give rise to an indirect mediating process that makes individuals more 
likely to perceive deficiencies in their actions during goal pursuit; this change in action 
monitoring leads them to reduce their perceptions of overall performance and feel corresponding 
regret. Further, the effect of regret changes depending on whether the individual has more or less 
experience with the goal – with experience, regret can help people to get back on track but for 
novices it leads planners to judge that future success at the goal is less likely, yielding a 
subsequent reduction in goal-consistent behavior. This indirect process works in opposition to 
other concurrent processes, weakening the total impact of setting plans. 
In this paper, we will first review the literature on planning and implementation 
intentions. Second, Study 1 will demonstrate that cnges in the way that individuals are asked 
to plan influences the means that they consider to pursue the goal. In Studies 2 and 3, we connect 
those changes in content to downstream action. Study 2 is a field experiment that reveals an 
indirect process linking plan content, evaluation of past actions, regret, outcome expectancies, 





demonstrates the role of goal experience as a moderator (see FIGURE 1.1). Together, these 
findings reveal a new process underlying the link between implementation intentions and action, 
and provide valuable perspective on why sometimes plans help or hinder goal pursuit. 
 







The relationship between goals and plans 
As a first step, it is useful to situate where plans fit within the broader context of goal 
systems. Goal setting and goal striving are typically conceived of as two separate but 
hierarchically related processes (Carver and Scheier 1982, 1990; Bagozzi and Dholakia 1999; 
Gollwitzer 1999). Goal setting encompasses how indiv duals identify needs, form intentions, and 
commit to achieving desired end-states. For example, imagine an out-of-shape student who 
notices that they are continually short of breath when climbing the stairs, stimulating a desire to 
exercise more frequently and a goal intention as an expression of a commitment to start visiting 
the gym on a regular basis (“This is the year I will start working out!”) Indeed, marketers often 
try to influence such intentions with sales and advertising communications – an advertisement 
that prompts a consumer to think, “Yes, it’s time for me to buy a new car this year!” and thus 
express the intention to make that purchase operates at this level. 
After an individual has formed the intention to purs e a goal, the next step is to determine 
how he or she will strive toward it. To do so, peopl  may form plans, which are often referred to 
as implementation intentions. 1  Plans define means or actions that will help propel the individual 
toward the desired end state. Thus, they serve to support goal intentions by defining how action 
is intended to occur, bridging the gap between the intended end state and what actions are 
actually carried out in support of that objective. For example, our prospective exerciser may set 
plans to go to the gym three times per week on his way home from the office, or to call a friend 
                                                 
 
1 Both “planning” and “implementation intentions” have been used with varying frequency in the literature with 
similar intent; for brevity, in this paper I will use the term “plan” and “planning” to also mean “implementation 






for advice when physical exhaustion sets in and one more step on the treadmill feels like one too 
many. 
Following planning, individuals carry out action in support of their goals, monitoring their 
actions and adjusting their behaviors as necessary to move toward desired end states and away 
from undesired ones. This monitoring information geerates affect and is used to determine 
whether action in support of the goal should continue, whether efforts should be reduced, or 
whether the goal should be abandoned (Carver and Scheier 1982, 1990; Bagozzi and Dholakia 
1999). If our gym-going student has been successful at maintaining attendance on the treadmill, 
he should feel positive emotion and perceive progress, serving as a signal that goal pursuit 
should continue, but if his efforts have been unsuccessful, he will likely feel negative emotions 
and adjust by redoubling his efforts or by concluding, “Well, maybe this gym stuff isn’t for me.” 
Of course, the emotional response that is felt is rooted in one’s appraisal of the situation, which 
is sometimes independent of objective progress. While successfully progressing toward the goal 
will most likely lead to positive emotions, one can also think, “I could have done more,” 
prompting a negative emotional experience. Similarly, even with insufficient progress, one may 
conclude, “Well, I did make some progress…it’s a start,” and feel positively.  
The two examples discussed above also highlight that people can make plans for different 
reasons. Consider that a plan to go to the gym three times per week on the way home from the 
office details means to propel the individual toward the goal – to take steps to get “from start to 
finish.” In contrast, a plan to call a friend for advice when one’s energy starts to wane outlines a 
strategy for how to cope with an obstacle that hinders the ability to achieve the goal. 
This distinction between planning for how to facilitate steps (which we will call “step plans”) 





a division in the health psychology literature that is often not mentioned in the broader literature 
on implementation intentions. Sniehotta and his colleagues (e.g. Sniehotta et al. 2005; Sniehotta, 
Scholz, and Schwarzer 2006; Araújo-Soares, McIntyre, and Sniehotta 2009) argue that these two 
types of plans (which they call “action planning” and “coping planning”) represent separate but 
related constructs that differ in content but that are underlaid by similar perceptual, attentional, 
and mnemonic processes.2 Sniehotta et al. (2005) argue that step plans are primary – defining 
and simulating actions to proceed toward the goal is relatively straightforward – but that forming 
coping plans requires some experience with the task, as predicting environmental barriers and 
one’s reaction to them is more difficult if knowledge with the task is low. This pattern of relative 
primacy of steps and neglect of obstacles is similarly found in the literature on the planning 
fallacy, which describes how people estimate the amount of time that it will take to complete an 
action. When forecasting how an action will unfold, people take an “inside view” and construct a 
personal narrative of the steps they expect to take to r ach the goal, while neglecting to consider 
problems and base rates of success that would be accomplished by adopting a more “outside 
view.” As a result, their predictions for task completion time tend to be overly optimistic 
compared to reality, because they do not consider that things may go awry (Kahneman and 
Lovallo 1993; Buehler, Griffin, and Ross 1994; Buehler, Griffin, and Peetz 2010; Dunning 
2007). For example, when asked to forecast their completion time for an upcoming academic 
                                                 
 
2 We have chosen to label “action plans” as “step plans” because plans to cope with obstacles also involve taking 
action. For the remainder of the paper, we will usethe labels “step plans” and “action plans.” We furthe  note that 
Sniehotta et al (2005) also restrict their consideration of the situational component of a coping plan to reflect only an 
individual’s internal reaction to a barrier (e.g. feeling tempted to skip a running trip because of fatigue) and not the 
presence of an environmental obstacle in-and-of itself (e.g. running is hindered because the gym is clo ed or it is 
raining outside). We see the primary distinction between these two types of plans as considering proactive means to 
facilitate progress toward the goal versus considering how to overcome problems and we do not perceive a change 
in the logic when removing this restriction, so we do not employ it in our conceptualization of coping plans. In our 
use of the word “step” we mean to distinguish facilitat ve actions from strategies to cope with obstacles. We do not 





project and to describe their process using a speak-aloud protocol, students overwhelmingly 
focused their attention on steps to reach the goal (71% of thoughts; e.g. “I plan to go to my 
parents’ place and use their personal computer to type i  up today”). Only 3% of thoughts 
involved problems or barriers to goal achievement (.g. “I don’t know, it might take a bit longer 
because I’m not quite caught up in this”; Buehler et al. 1994) Interestingly, forming plans for 
when, where, and how action should occur increases this tendency to focus on a constructed and 
seemingly straightforward narrative from the start o the finish of goal pursuit (Buehler and 
Griffin 2003). 
Thus, in the broader picture of goal pursuit, plans support goal intentions by detailing the 
means by which an individual intends to reach an end state. As people pursue their goals, they 
monitor their progress, feel resulting emotion, anddjust their future intentions and actions. 
People can make plans to execute steps to propel them from the start of goal pursuit to the finish 
(e.g. going to the gym 3 times per week on the way home from work) or for how to cope with 
obstacles (e.g. calling a friend when experiencing fati ue). The natural tendency seems to be to 
consider steps; considering how to cope with obstacles does not happen spontaneously and is 
more likely to arise after obtaining experience with the task. 
Processes underlying the functions of plans 
As anyone who has set a New Year’s resolution knows, it is often difficult to move from 
goal intentions (“This is the year I will start working out!”) into actual actions (feet on the 
treadmill). Simply “muddling through” often leaves individuals susceptible to problems with 
getting started, becoming distracted, and failing to discontinue goal pursuit when necessary. 





happen during goal pursuit with pre-deliberated actions (Gollwitzer 1999). A number of studies 
have examined the cognitive processes that work together to form this bridge. 
First, consider the situational component of a plan. By thinking about when and where 
the individual intends to carry out goal-consistent action, it establishes this situation as a 
behavioral cue. Upon encountering the cued situation, a planner is more likely to recognize and 
remember it as a time when goal-consistent action is i tended. Second, planners are more likely 
to act efficiently because deliberation “in the moment” about what action to take is not necessary 
(Gollwitzer 1999). Past research has demonstrated that all of these processes – cue detection, 
memory, and efficient action initiation – work togeth r to make goal achievement more likely 
(Parks-Stamm, Gollwitzer, and Oettingen 2007; Achtziger, Gollwitzer, and Sheeran 2008). To 
continue the example of working out, it should be easi r for our exerciser to recognize situations 
when fatigue is starting, and when this cue is detect d, it should take minimal thought and effort 
to reach for phone to call one’s friend for advice. 
Planning interventions have taken many forms in the existing literature, but how these 
forms are alike and different is not well understood (Hagger and Luszczynska 2014; but see 
Oettingen, Hönig, and Gollwitzer 2000; Chapman, Armitage, and Norman 2009). In many cases, 
these interventions have been assumed to work in similar ways and used interchangeably, 
sometimes within the same paper. For instance, in the first study of their seminal paper on the 
effect of implementation intentions, Gollwitzer and Brandstätter (1997) use a planning 
manipulation taking the form, “When I encounter thesituational context y, then I will perform 
behavior z!” In their second study, the planning task is different - participants are asked to think 
about a specific time (“e.g. after breakfast the next morning”) and place (“e.g. in a quiet corner in 





While both of these types of prompts include the same ingredients – both ask planners to 
think about an action they will carry out and the situation in which that action should occur – 
they do so in different ways. The first type of plan, which we will refer to as an “if-then” prompt, 
asks participants to first specify a situational contingency and then match that situation with an 
action. For example, “If I am feeling tired at the gym, then I will call my friend for advice!” In 
contrast, the second type of plan, which we will refe  to as a “when-where-how” prompt, takes a 
different focus. When-where-how planners are instructed to think about a goal-consistent action 
and then to elaborate upon the details for when that action should be executed. For example, a 
participant might write, “WHAT: Go to the gym, WHEN: At 5:00 pm, WHERE: Gold’s, at the 
corner of Jones and State, HOW: By stopping in on my way home from work, FOR HOW 
LONG: I’ll go for an hour.  
In sum, plans bridge the gap between goal intentions and the execution by forming 
associations between situational cues and goal-consiste t actions. They do so by making goal 
pursuit more automatic – plans increase the salience of the situations when action is intended and 
eliminate the need to deliberate about what to do. Researchers have used varied methods to 
induce planning; if-then plans ask participants to pecify the situational component and match it 
with a contingent action, and when-where-how plans y out an action and elaborate upon the 
situation in which it should be carried out. A criti al question is whether this difference in format 
will translate into changes in the situations and actions that people consider when forming their 
plans.  
Plan structure influences plan focus 
We argue that the structure of these prompts guides planners to be more or less likely to 





lay out a desired action and then elaborate on one of the possible circumstances where could be 
carried out. This type of thought process mirrors what people do naturally when thinking about 
goals – as mentioned above, when asked to “think aloud” about reaching an ongoing goal, 
thoughts about when, where, and how steps will be executed are much more common than 
thoughts about obstacles, which are rare (Buehler, Griffin, and Ross 1994). Conversely, if-then 
prompts start by asking participants to first consider a circumstance when they will act, which 
frames the plan as strict contingent response to a s imulus – action is initiated if this stimulus is 
present. If not, presumably action fails to occur. Thus, people are induced to think reactively. 
The difference seems akin to a when-where-how planner asking the questions, “So what I am I 
going to do to pursue this goal? OK, now under what circumstances will I do it?” versus in an if-
then plan, “What types of situations do I think will happen as I pursue this goal? OK, now what 
will do in response?”  
Recall from earlier in this discussion that people can make plans to enact steps toward the 
goal, and they can make plans for how to cope with obstacles. When left to their own devices, 
they are far more likely to consider steps as opposed to obstacles. However, by placing a planner 
in a mindset where he or she is induced to think about how they will react if they happen to 
encounter a situation, it seems likely that obstacles – which require our reaction when they arise 
– will be more salient. Thus, 
 
H1: If-then prompts will increase the salience of means to cope with obstacles, while when-
where-how prompts will lead participants to be more likely to think of steps. Further, when 






Note that it is not the case that if-then prompts and when-where-how pr m ts necessarily 
lead participants to focus exclusively upon obstacle-coping strategies or steps. Both planning 
prompts can accommodate either type of action. For example, Bayer, Gollwitzer & Achtziger 
(2010) discuss if-then plans in both ways, citing plans like, “…if I have solved one anagram, 
then I will immediately start to work on the next!” (step plan), and “If I am getting nervous, then 
I will try to stay calm!” (coping plan). Rather, we predict that the plan format at hand will guide 
participants to spontaneously be more likely to consider steps or obstacles accordingly. 
Thus, one factor that could explain why plans seem to yield inconsistent results is that 
researchers and practitioners are referring to a wide variety of interventions as the same and 
using them in an interchangeable manner when actually they guide thought and action in 
different ways. Examining these differences in thought content is important because each type of 
plan is likely to yield different consequences for motivation and perception during goal pursuit, 
which should influence subsequent cognition and action. 
Plan content and the process of goal pursuit over time 
Our second focus in this paper is to examine the processes underlying these plans in goals 
that mirror many consumption situations like saving money, eating a healthy diet, exercising, etc. 
– those that are pursued over time, demand ongoing regulation of behavior, and require 
monitoring of actions to infer performance. A great deal of research has looked at the final 
outcomes of planning – in other words, whether plans make people more likely to achieve their 
goals. Often, plans work well (Gollwitzer and Sheeran 2006). However, as detailed above, they 
sometimes do not work as intended, particularly in complex settings like those characteristic of 
consumption goals. Part of this uncertainty in the literature may be due to how plans change the 





In his discussion of plans which are intended to lay out means to progress toward the goal 
(what we have called action plans) and plans designd to cope with obstacles (coping plans), 
Sniehotta (2005) speculates that, “Although content and purpose of the planning constructs are 
different, it is assumed that the mediating perceptual, attentional (e.g. by facilitating the detection 
of situational cues) and mnemonic processes (e.g. by remembering the cues) are the same” (p. 
568). However, to our knowledge, it is unclear at this ime whether both step plans and coping 
plans actually function similarly at the process level. Indeed, in their recent review, Hagger and 
Luszczynska (2014) call for further research on understanding relationships and differences 
between the action planning / coping planning constructs commonly used in health psychology 
and the implementation intentions construct typically found in the social psychology and 
consumer behavior literatures. It seems reasonable to suggest that if plans work by facilitating 
the detection of specific situations and removing the need to deliberate about specific 
corresponding actions (those contained within the plan), underlying process differences may also 
manifest if the content of those situations and actions changes.  
One way that plans might affect the process of goalpursuit over time is by altering the ways 
in which individuals consider whether or not they have carried out actions in support of the goal. 
Indeed, such monitoring of behavior is a critical prt of goal pursuit – both Control Theory 
(Carver and Scheier 1982, 1990) and Bagozzi & Dholakia’s model of consumer goal setting and 
striving (1999) postulate that individuals evaluate th ir ongoing behavior, asking themselves how 
well they have executed their intended actions and whether the rate of progress toward the goal is 
suitable. Armed with this information, individuals feel emotion about their performance and use 





We argue that because they can foster inflexibility in detecting situations to act, coping 
plans disrupt this process, making people more likely to perceive insufficient progress. The result 
is feelings of regret. For people who are experienced at pursuing the goal at hand, this regret can 
be motivating, prompting increased expectancies about future performance and behavioral 
reform. In contrast, regret can be demotivating for n vices, causing reduced expectancies about 
future performance and a resulting decrease in goal-consistent action. We will now detail each of 
these components in turn. 
Plans, regulatory focus, and action monitoring 
 In order to accurately answer the question, “Have I carried out the actions that I intended 
to complete in order to pursue this goal?” individuals must be able to consider actions that they 
have taken, judge their sufficiency, and connect them to the goal at hand. However, this 
judgment is often open to interpretation; people oft n misjudge or are biased in their evaluations 
of performance while pursuing valued goals (Campbell and Warren 2015). If individuals are 
unable to develop a complete picture of what they have done – for example, because only a 
subset of actions that were taken are recalled, or because the set of actions was judged to be 
insufficient - evaluations of progress are likely to be lower. 
While plans have been shown to increase cue detection and action efficiency, they also 
often carry with them a cost in terms of flexibility. The act of setting plans leads individuals to 
narrow their cognitive focus toward selective, heigtened processing of those particular 
situations and actions, while also creating a closed-mindedness toward information that is 
incompatible with the chosen means of goal implementation (Gollwitzer and Bayer 1999; see 
also Bayuk et al. 2010). As a result, accessibility of the situations and actions contained within 





pursuing effortful goals that require the regulation of many behaviors over time. Unexpected 
opportunities to enact steps and unforeseen barriers to goal achievement are likely to arise, 
requiring the individual to act in situations and ways that were unplanned. For instance, recall 
our earlier example of calling a friend for advice when motivation to work out is low, or going to 
the gym at 5:00 pm on the way home from work. Other circumstances might arise where those 
same actions would also be useful – calling a friend when encountering the obstacle of not 
knowing how to perform a certain exercise, or going to the gym over lunch break, for instance. 
Unfortunately, past work demonstrates that plans ca create perceptual “lock-in,” interfering 
with the ability to pivot toward goal-consistent but unplanned opportunities to act.  
For example, Parks-Stamm and her colleagues (2007) demonstrated how plans reduce 
flexibility in detecting unplanned chances to act using a listening task. Participants were given 
the task of listening to a story and typing the first letter of “each and every five-letter word” they 
heard as quickly as possible. Respondents in the planning condition made a plan to respond to 
two of these target words – “Laura” and “mouse” – while non-planners made no plan. Making a 
plan did not help or hinder overall performance – both groups identified the same number of 
five-letter words – but it did change the types of w rds that were detected. Participants who 
formed plans were more likely to recognize the words “Laura” and “mouse,” but their 
performance at detecting all of the other five-letter words present in the story was worse than 
participants who had not formed a plan. Thus, the plan helped participants to carry out the 
specific action that they had anticipated, but hurt their ability to recognize unplanned 
opportunities to reach the goal.  
Similarly, Masicampo and Baumeister (2012) showed participants a series of websites 





year) during the session. Participants in the planning condition formed a plan to use Wikipedia to 
find the target information while participants in the control condition simply wrote “Bill 
Murray’s birth year” repeatedly. When the opportuniy to use Wikipedia was made available to 
participants, having the plan facilitated performance – planners were more likely to find Bill 
Murray’s birth year than non-planners. However, when the experimenters removed access to the 
planned opportunity to act, planners were less likely to use an alternate means to achieve the goal 
(looking up the information on IMDb.com). Follow-up analyses indicated that this deficiency 
stemmed from planners’ inattention to out-of-plan opp rtunities – they were less likely to notice 
that another path to achieve the goal existed.  
Thus, while plans often facilitate the detection of planned situations and the execution of 
corresponding actions, their inflexibility can also hurt the ability to pivot to ways that fall outside 
the scope of the plan. In turn, when the individual looks back to ask, “How am I doing,” a plan is 
likely to narrow that window of attention on those circumstances that were planned in advance 
while failing to account for other actions that were taken but were unplanned. 
Further, research on regulatory focus orientation suggests that this inflexibility in 
monitoring is likely to be particularly impactful for planners who consider obstacles – in other 
words, for people who form coping plans. Regulatory f cus describes a motivational orientation 
toward goal pursuit. A promotion focus orients indivi uals toward ideals, a sensitivity to gains / 
non-gains, and means that are eager and approach-focused. Conversely, a prevention focus 
places emphasis on oughts, security, sensitivity to losses / non-losses, and means that are vigilant 
and avoidance-focused (Higgins 1997). Regulatory focus may be either chronic or induced in-
the-moment. Indeed, Freitas, Liberman and Higgins (2002) argue that the means contained 





avoid problems are likely to prime a prevention focus, while plans that invoke eager matches to 
desired end states should induce a promotion focus. Thus, adopting vigilant coping strategies to 
overcome obstacles – as we predict will happen in a if-then plan – is likely to induce a 
prevention-oriented mindset. Similarly, thinking about steps to reach a goal – as we predict for 
when-where-how planners and control participants – should encourage the adoption of a 
promotion focus.  
Many studies have demonstrated that a prevention focus leads people to process and 
judge information in a narrower, more restrictive manner that would predict lower evaluations of 
performance. First, regulatory focus orientation is as ociated with elaboration style. Specifically, 
a prevention focus leads to item-specific elaboratin – restricting focus to dig deep within a 
category – while simultaneously reducing the likelihood of engaging in relational elaboration – 
forging connections between disparate items (Zhu and Meyers-Levy 2007). Zhu and Myers-Levy 
demonstrate this connection between regulatory focus and cognitive elaboration using both a 
memory task and an ad evaluation task. Participants in their memory study were exposed to a 
regulatory focus induction to prime promotion or prevention orientation and then provided a list 
of 36 words from six categories (e.g. occupations, musical instruments, etc.). After a filler task, 
participants then engaged in two recall tasks. In a free-recall task, prevention focus led to a 
reduction in clustering (i.e. recalling consecutive items from the same category, which is an 
indicator of relational processing) and improved performance on a cued-recall task, which is 
characteristic of item-specific processing (Hunt and Einstein 1981; Zhu and Meyers-Levy 2007). 
In a second study, participants were shown advertisements for a camera that featured a headline 
consistent with either a promotion focus or a prevention focus and that contained thematic 





connected to photography (e.g. travel, adventure). B cause they were prompted to elaborate 
relationally, promotion-focused participants were able to better integrate and understand ads 
which contained non-obvious themes, and they also rep rted greater liking for them. In contrast, 
prevention-focused participants did not identify a greater number of themes for ads with visuals 
that went beyond those that were tightly connected to cameras, and they reported greater liking 
for ads where the connections to photography were plainly evident. As such, people whose 
planning for obstacles has left them in a prevention focus should be more likely to narrow their 
focus of recall and elaboration to only that set of actions that closely correspond with the means 
that were planned, and be less likely to be able to branch out to consider other alternative, 
unplanned actions that may have also been taken in support of the goal. 
Second, prevention focus should also narrow the range of actions that are judged to 
positively contribute to goal pursuit. To demonstrate that plans reduce the attractiveness of out-
of-plan alternatives, Bayuk, Janiszewski, and LeBoeuf (2010) induced promotion or prevention 
focus and asked participants to form a savings goal. Some participants were also directed to form 
plans in support of that goal. When participants were oriented toward a prevention focus, 
forming a plan led to a reduced willingness to take dvantage of out-of-plan means to achieve the 
goal, versus having formed no plan. Conversely, adopting a promotion focus increased the range 
of acceptable actions to pursue the goal, as planners w re more likely to endorse out-of-plan 
means.  
Third, regulatory focus also influences judgments about conjunction and disjunction, 
which are likely to influence whether people consider the actions that they have taken to be 
sufficient for success. Brockner and his colleagues (2002) argue that prevention focus leads 





condition), while promotion focus is associated with an orientation toward disjunction (the belief 
that any one step is sufficient to satisfy a condition). This argument is also nicely illustrated by 
Friedman (1999; as cited in Brockner et al. [2002]), who describes the association between a 
prevention focus and conjunction as such: 
“…consider the goal of securing one’s home from burglars, murderers, and other 
societal riffraff. Means of attaining this prevention goal include keeping windows 
and doors locked while asleep or away from home. . . . In prevention, danger 
(e.g., the prospect of a break-in) can not be averted with certainty unless all 
pathways to danger are effectively overcome” (pp. 25–26; emphasis added to 
original quotation). 
 
In contrast, a promotion orientation is more strongly associated with the sufficiency of any single 
path (Friedman 1999; as cited in Brockner et al. [2002]): 
“…consider the goal of seeking accomplishment by means of accumulating vast 
wealth. This promotion goal can be attained in a variety of ways, such as by 
becoming a successful Wall Street trader, or by winning the state lottery, or . . . 
Once the individual has successfully pursued one route to this promotion goal 
(i.e., wealth acquisition) he or she need not pursue alternative routes. . . . Any 
successful route to a promotion goal is a sufficient route” (p. 25; emphasis added 
to original quotation). 
 
Indeed, Brockner et al. demonstrated that when participants were asked to engage in a 
judgment task measuring accuracy for conjunctive events (specifically, participants were shown 
an array of Xs and Os and were asked to estimate the proportion of paths from the top of the 
array to the bottom that were composed of all Xs), those who reported a greater orientation 
toward prevention displayed improved accuracy at detecting the proportion of conjunctive paths. 
Conversely, promotion focus led to the opposite outc me: improved accuracy at judging 
disjunctive events (the proportion of paths composed of at least one X) thanks to a reduced 
disjunctive bias. The implication of this finding for planning is that people who are prevention-





more likely to be attuned to the perspective that tey have to complete each and every action to 
achieve their goal. Conversely, the disjunctive focus brought on by promotion focus (as we argue 
should occur for when-where-how planners) should allow individuals to be able to point to a 
limited number of actions to say, “I’m doing OK.” 
Taken together, existing research predicts that when individuals look back and evaluate 
how they have acted in support of their goal, setting a plan is likely to narrow their focus to the 
specific actions within that plan. This tendency to focus narrowly on achieving the entire set of 
these particular actions should be especially powerful for planners focused on obstacle coping. 
While step plans are likely to facilitate broadening the definition of success to include these 
alternate possibilities, this is less likely for coping plans.  
How does this affect the evaluation of actions taken (or not taken)? In the types of 
consumption-oriented contexts that we have studied and which require effortful behavior over 
time (e.g. saving money, exercising, studying, etc.), here are likely to be many routes to success 
or failure. However, if individuals are focused on a limited set of means, it seems less likely that 
they will report “doing what needed to be done.” In the event they failed to carry out their 
planned action, that failure should be immediately apparent and other positive, goal-consistent 
actions that might compensate are likely to be inhibited by the narrow focus of a coping plan. 
Conversely, if individuals successfully executed their plan, they are still likely missing the 







H2: Setting if-then plans, because they are more strongly focused on coping with obstacles, 
will reduce evaluations of past performance compared to not setting a plan. When-where-
how plans, which are focused on steps, will not differ from not setting a plan. 
Subsequent effects of planning on the goal pursuit process: Regret, outcome expectancies, future 
action, and moderation by experience 
Both Control Theory (Carver and Scheier 1982, 1990) and Bagozzi & Dholakia’s model 
of consumer goal setting and striving (1999) postulate that the monitoring processes we have 
described have multiple outputs – when people monitor their rate of performance toward a goal, 
they experience changes in emotions, expectancies for future success, and behavior. If past 
performance has been good, this serves as a signal to the individual that they are on track and 
should maintain the same course, and leads to positive emotions thanks to a sense of 
achievement (Carver and Scheier 1982). Conversely, if past performance has been substandard, 
negative emotions occur, pushing the individual to ref rm their behavior and try to improve, or 
reduce their efforts in support of that goal if theperceived likelihood of future success is low 
(Carver and Scheier 1982; Soman and Cheema 2004). 
Regret is the likely emotional outcome when monitoring leads to the recognition of 
deficient goal progress. Regret arises from counterfactual thought – by pointing to actions that 
one has taken or failed to take – and it is built upon the realization that the situation would have 
been better if one had acted differently (Zeelenberg 1999; Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007). Because 
plans increase the salience of specific actions that the individual intends to perform in service of 
the goal, regret is more appropriate to examine than disappointment, which is associated with 
outcomes caused by external forces (Zeelenberg et al. 1998) or guilt, which involves harming 





reasons. Often, they feel regretful over a bad outcome. However, regret can also arise for reasons 
that are independent of outcome – when there is inconsistency between one’s intentions and 
actions, or when the process used to arrive at a choice is suboptimal (Connolly and Zeelenberg 
2002; Pieters and Zeelenberg 2005). Critically, someti es regret can be motivating, spurring 
learning, persistence, and belief in future change, while sometimes it can lead to self-reproach 
and hopelessness (Inman 2007; Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007).  
As a result, regret is likely to influence the ways in which people form expectancies about 
whether or not they will successfully achieve the goal in the future. One factor that may 
moderate this influence is the amount of experience that the individual has with the goal. In 
addition to feelings and judgments about their current ate of progress, people form expectancies 
by processing multiple sources of information, such as memories of prior outcomes and the 
ability to conjure up alternate strategies to change behavior. These other pieces of evidence often 
have a greater influence on the formation of expectancies than information about current 
performance (Carver and Scheier 1990). However, the availability and richness of these other 
pieces of evidence are likely to vary widely depending on the individual’s level of goal 
experience.  
People who have pursued the same goal many times before are able to draw upon a wider 
range of memories when success was at hand or behavioral reform happened; they have more 
pieces of the puzzle present in order to form a picture of how future goal pursuit will unfold. 
Thus, feelings about the level of current performance – like regret – are likely to have less 
negative impact in the formation of a judgment about whether future goal success is possible. 
While experienced goal-strivers may feel some doubt about the road ahead, those thoughts are 





us to remember such past occasions and develop an orientation toward learning and improving 
for next time (Zeelenberg 1999; Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007). In contrast, novices have fewer 
past experiences to draw upon, so current feelings should loom large in judging expectations 
about the future. Without the broader perspective afforded by the ability to remember a variety of 
past actions and choices, it is easy to judge what ill happen in the future by placing all one’s 
focus on feelings and events in the here-and-now. Because experience with the goal is sparse, 
summary judgments that attribute performance to ability or personality seem more likely. It is 
easy to imagine a novice dieter saying, “I didn’t remember my gym clothes once this week and 
wow, do I feel bad; maybe this whole health kick isn’t for me.” For novices, the goal is more 
likely to be new and uncertain, making it easy to believe that setbacks will be permanent, causing 
regret to reduce positive and increase negative expctancies for future outcomes.  
Finally, expectancies about the likelihood of future success influence what the individual 
chooses to do next in pursuit of the goal. When future success seems possible, one can respond 
by continuing to reduce the discrepancy between the current state and the goal. Here regret 
frequently serves as a “kick in the pants” – the individual knows information from past 
experiences about the feasibility of achieving the goal, so he or she can push for improved 
performance on subsequent attempts and try to learnfrom mistakes (Zeelenberg 1999; Roese and 
Summerville 2005). However, if feeling regretful has painted a bleak picture of what will happen 
in the future, the result is often a reduction in effort and goal-consistent action (Carver and 






H3: Reduced evaluations of performance will lead to feelings of regret. Task experience 
will moderate the effect of regret, leading to reduced outcome expectancies and subsequent 
future performance for novices but not for more experienced individuals. 
 






STUDY 1: DOES PLAN FORMAT INFLUENCE PLAN CONTENT? 
Study 1 was intended to demonstrate that the content of implementation intentions is 
naturally influenced by the ways in which the plan is constructed. Specifically, we examined two 
commonly-used types of planning interventions – “if-then” and “when-where-how” prompts – 
that are often used interchangeably. We predicted that forming plans using each of these two 
methods would spontaneously guide individuals to focus upon different information when 
considering how to pursue a goal, even when they ar not directed to do so by the task 
instructions. Specifically, we expected participants who formed if-then plans to focus more 
intently on means to cope with obstacles, and participants who formed when-where-how plans to 
focus on steps to reach the goal. For comparison, two control conditions for the present analyses 
were also included: a free-plan condition where participants were simply instructed to make a 
plan without any further direction, and a “reversed if-then condition.” The latter was intended to 
demonstrate the role of thought order in the planning process. We expected that participants who 
were first asked to think about an action and then to elaborate upon the situation in which they 
planned to execute it would be significantly less likely to form obstacle-coping plans. 
Participants and Method 
To test the prediction that plan format influences plan content, 281 student participants at 
a large U.S. university completed a study on finishi g their holiday shopping, in a task adapted 
from Buehler and Griffin (2003). One participant completed the study but did not provide any 
valid responses, leaving 280 participants available for analysis. Sample size was determined in 
advance, based on the availability of participants. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 






The study was run from the middle of November to the beginning of December, at the 
start of the shopping season for Christmas (December 25, 2014), Hanukkah (December 6-14, 
2014), and Kwanzaa (December 26, 2014 – January 1, 2015). Participants listed three people for 
whom they still needed to buy gifts and were asked how much of their holiday shopping for 
those people they had left to complete. The majority f participants (92%) had not yet started 
their holiday shopping, and no participant reported b ing more than 2/3 finished their shopping. 
Participants then proceeded to the planning intervention. As part of the task instructions, 
we provided participants with two example plans. We took care to ensure these examples were 
not leading; each set of examples included one step plan and one coping plan, and the order of 
these was randomly counterbalanced across participants. Examples of each type of plan (which 
were the same examples presented to participants) may be found in TABLE 1.1. 
 
In all conditions, participants completed four plan statements. The prompts for each 
condition are shown in APPENDIX 1.1. In the if-then condition, participants were directed to 
first think about a situation in which they would act, and then a corresponding action. To 
complete their plans, they filled in blank fields labelled, “IF (fill in a situation),” and, “THEN 
(fill in an action).” In contrast, participants in the when-where-how condition thought about an 
action and then a situation, and completed plan statements containing fields for the planned 
action “WHAT (fill in an action)”, as well as when, where, how, and for how long that action 
would be carried out. In the if-then-reversed condition, participants were instructed to think 
about an action and then a situation using blanks marked “ACTION (fill in an action)” and “IF 
(fill in a situation).” Finally, in the control condition, participants were simply given four blank 






We evaluated the naturalistic content of participants’ plans. Two coders who were blind 
to the study hypotheses categorized respondents’ plans as describing a facilitative step or means 
to cope with an obstacle; they first coded plans independently with substantial interrater 
reliability (intraclass correlation for proportions = .96) and then resolved as many differences as 
possible by mutual agreement. 
As predicted, the way in which participants’ plans were elicited influenced the situations 
and actions that they considered. We calculated the proportion of each participant’s plan 
statements that were focused on obstacle coping and examined between-condition differences 
using an ANOVA with planned comparisons. Because the dependent variable is a proportion, we 
employed an arcsine-root transformation as directed by Sokal and Rohlf (1995).3 Untransformed 
means are reported below for interpretability. 
When not given guidance on how to form plans in the control condition, participants 
focused most of their attention on steps, forming plans to cope with obstacles only rarely 
(MCONTROL= 4.29%, SD = .12). When-where-how planners acted in much the same way, but with 
a slightly greater propensity to focus on steps (MWWH = 0%, SD = .00; F(1,276) = 1.62, p = .21). 
In contrast, if-then planners focused much more intntly on coping plans for how to overcome 
barriers to the goal (MIT = 58.33%; SD = .37), a proportion that was significantly greater than 
control (F(1,276) = 178.90, p < .001). As expected, reducing the reactive nature of the plan by 
considering the goal-consistent situation prior to the action in the if-then reversed condition led 
                                                 
 
3 Analyses using an ANOVA with log transformed DV yielded substantively identical results. Analyses using a 
generalized linear model with a binomial variance function (including robust standard errors) and log link function 
as recommended by the UCLA Statistical Consulting Group (n.d.) yielded substantively identical results except the 





to a significant drop in the proportion of obstacles planned for, compared to the if-then condition 
(M IT-REV = 37.15%, SD = .29; F(1,276) = 22.35, p < .001). 
 
---INSERT FIGURE 1.2 ABOUT HERE--- 
Discussion 
Thus, a clear pattern emerged from the coded ratings of participants’ plans across the two 
analyses. Despite the fact that different plan formats have been used in the literature, it is evident 
that not all plans are equivalent. The way in which a plan is constructed guides participants to 
spontaneously think about different situations and ctions for goal pursuit.  
Specifically, when left to their own devices, indivi uals rarely consider how to cope with 
obstacles and instead focus on steps to progress from the start to the finish of the goal. Forming a 
when-where-how plan also prompts planners to think about steps. However, by prompting 
individuals to first think about a situation in whic  they will act and then to deliberate over a 
contingent action, if-then plans greatly increase the likelihood that coping plans will be formed. 
Underscoring the importance of thought order in this process, a reversed version of the if-then 
prompt where the action is decided upon first and then the appropriate situation is elaborated 
upon (“Action…if”) yielded a significant drop in the proportion of coping plans that were 
formed. 
This finding is important because it demonstrates that planning interventions are not 
interchangeable. This should influence both the information that is attended to during goal 
pursuit, and in turn, affect the actions that peopl undertake over time, leading to possible 
differences in effectiveness and consistency across plan types. In Studies 2 and 3, we expand 





obstacles, generate processes that influence the subj ctive experience of goal pursuit, and in turn, 







STUDY 2: PURSUING AN ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT GOAL 
Study 2 was intended as an initial test of the proposed process model. To maximize 
external validity and best approximate the impact of this process for real goals that require the 
effortful regulation of behavior in a manner similar to many consumption and purchase 
behaviors, we conducted a field experiment in the context of a consequential academic 
achievement goal.  
Studying behavior represents an ideal context for this investigation. Although devoting 
time to studying is a highly valued objective for the participant population at hand (college 
students in a selective and competitive undergraduate program), they often experience difficulty 
achieving this goal. In addition, studying requires maintenance of behavior over time, often in 
the absence of a direct connection to results (i.e. studying does not guarantee good grades, and 
there is a delay to performance on an evaluation). In this way, studying maintains many of the 
same features as other self-control goals like eating healthily, controlling spending, or exercising 
regularly. 
Participants and Method 
Undergraduate business students enrolled in an accounting course at a large U.S. 
university participated in exchange for candy and the chance to win a gift card. Sample size was 
determined by the number of students enrolled in the course; all students were given the 
opportunity to volunteer to participate in the experiment. 
The focus of the investigation was a self-set study time goal for an upcoming quiz in the 
course. This study was conducted in three waves. Wave 1 took place one week prior to the quiz, 
Wave 2 was administered immediately after the quiz, and Wave 3 occurred in the period 





Respondents in the if-then action condition read instructions and an example for the planning 
intervention, generated three obstacles that might impede their study time goal, and then formed 
three if-then statements specifying a situation when and where they might encounter the obstacle 
and a corresponding action they would carry out (e.g. “If I am getting tired while I am studying, 
then I will drink a cup of coffee”). Participants were directed to repeat the statements in their 
head until they were confident they could remember th m. Participants in the when-where-how 
condition read instructions for the planning intervention, specified actions in support of their goal 
pursuit, and then when, where, how and for how long they would execute them (e.g. WHAT 
specific actions will I take to reach my goal: Review my lecture notes, WHEN will I take the 
actions to reach my goal: Every evening for the next week, WHERE will I take the actions to 
reach my goal: At the library, HOW will I take the actions to reach my goal: Read through the 
notes and summarize them, HOW LONG will I take the actions to reach my goal: About an hour 
a night). Respondents were directed to repeat the stat ments in their head until they were 
confident they could remember them. Participants in he control condition pursued their goals 
naturally without any directions to form plans. Finally, respondents in the if-then inaction 
followed the same procedure as in the if-then action c ndition, but specified actions that they 
would not take (e.g. “If I am getting tired while I am studying, then I will not take a nap”). For 
clarity, we will distinguish between these two types of if-then plans in this study using the labels 
“if-then action” and “if-then inaction.” 
We administered the if-then inaction condition as an attempt to further examine the 
relationship between plan content and action monitori g. As there exists a number of potential 
differences between plan formats (e.g. length), the if-then inaction condition allows for a direct 





dimensions constant, allowing us to rule out the influence of those other factors. To weigh the 
different implications for monitoring between an if-then action and an if-then inaction plan, 
consider what poor performance on each plan looks like. For an if-then inaction plan, committing 
an action represents poor follow-through. For example, in the plan, “If I have difficulty 
understanding a concept while studying, then I willnot take a break,” failing is committing the 
action at hand – taking a break. Conversely, failing to enact an if-then action plan is due to the 
omission of an action. For example, in the plan, “If I have difficulty understanding a concept 
while studying, then I will email the instructor,” omitting the action to contact the instructor 
represents poor plan adherence. Past research on the experience of regret has shown that the 
effects of these two types of failure are not equal – people try harder to deal with the emotional 
fallout of commissions through dissonance reduction (Gilovich, Medvec, and Chen 1995), and 
their memories of commissions remain less active than omissions, often causing rumination and 
self-recrimination (Savitsky, Medvec, and Gilovich 1997). As a result, individuals cognitively 
and emotionally deal with and move on from commission  quickly, but the fallout from 
omissions lingers over time (Gilovich and Medvec 1994). Thus, we predicted that the if-then 
inaction condition, where poor performance is represented by fast-fading commissions, would be 
less susceptible to our proposed process through action monitoring, regret, and behavioral 
change because people should resolve and move on from negative thoughts and feelings about 
poor performance very soon after they happen. In contrast, omissions, which linger over time, 
should persist in memory and lead to subsequent regret.  
At the start of Wave 1, we asked all participants to create a code word to match their 
responses over time, and to set an ambitious study time goal for the next week leading up to the 





which they filled in their number of intended daily studying hours. Respondents then supported 
their study time goal with a plan that varied across conditions as described above, and completed 
measures about their feelings and expectations for the next week of studying. They also received 
a sheet to track the number of hours that they studied. 
One week later, we administered Wave 2 of the study immediately following the quiz. 
Participants entered the hours that they actually studied for the quiz on a calendar identical to the 
one where they indicated their goal in Wave 1. This measure of actual study time was followed 
by a thought listing about how they could have improved upon their past week of studying, 
measures of participants’ study performance, emotional and behavioral reactions to their goal 
achievement, and intentions for future behavior. The measures used in our model are 
summarized in APPENDIX 1.2. We also administered a third set of items after participants 
received grades. These focused mainly on their performance on the quiz and were followed by 
demographics. Items in Wave 3 did not yield any notew rthy conclusions and are not discussed 
further. 
Two hundred sixty-six participants provided matched r sponses to Waves 1 and 2 and 
responded to all items in the serial model described below. However, the data from one section 
of the course were excluded from analysis because a student made a loud comment disparaging 
academic research during Wave 1. During data collection, we decided to exclude this section (31 
participants) as this student’s remarks may have led others to not take the task seriously, leaving 
235 respondents available for analysis.4  
                                                 
 
4 These analyses were also later conducted using the excluded section. Analysis of the expanded dataset reached the 
same conclusions, except for the reported number of study hours. With the excluded section included in the dataset, 
participants in the if-then action condition reported studying for fewer hours versus control (F(1,261) = 4.03, p = 






Across all conditions, the number of hours participants spent studying was relatively 
constant (MCTRL = 6.01, SDCTRL = 4.16; MIT-ACT = 5.22, SDIT-ACT = 3.28; MWWH = 5.69, SDWWH = 
4.20; MIT-INACT = 5.78, SDIT-INACT = 3.82) and an ANOVA with planned contrasts indicated that 
these differences were not significant compared to control (FIT-ACT / CTRL (1,230) = 1.20, p = .28; 
FIT-INACT / CTRL (1,230) = .10, p = .75; FWWH/CTRL (1,230) = .21, p = .65)5. Thus, plans did not 
change immediate performance, which holds actual gol achievement constant and yields a good 
test of their effect on monitoring, regret, and subsequent behavior. 
From this broader perspective, an interesting finding emerges that is consistent with the 
hypothesized process model. We ran a serial multiple mediator model (Hayes 2013; Hayes and 
Preacher 2014), which allows for the estimation of a sequential, mediated path between the 
independent and dependent variables. Consistent with our hypothesis, participants in the if-then 
action condition were more likely to report that they coped poorly with obstacles that hindered 
their studying, compared to the control condition (β = -.27, t(231) = -1.86, p = .064; see FIGURE 
1.3). This perceived poor performance at obstacle coping was associated with two outcomes. 
First, as predicted, the worse participants coped with obstacles, the more regret they felt about 
their performance (β = -.43, t(230) = -6.41, p < .001). While feeling regretful did not change 
participants’ outcome expectancies for their likelihood of achieving the goal of studying for the 
final exam (β = .09, t(229) = 1.47, p = .14) their feelings of regret were positively associated with 
intentions to study for the upcoming final exam (β = .20, t(228) = 3.44, p < .001). Second, 
outcome expectancies also played a role in participants’ intentions to engage in future studying 
goals, but not as a consequence of regret. Instead, judgments of obstacle-coping directly 
                                                 
 





influenced outcome expectancies (β = .18, t(229) = 2.58, p = .01). In turn, outcome expectancies 
also influenced intentions to study for the final exam (β = .50, t(228) = 8.22, p < .001). The end 
result was the presence of two significant, opposing indirect paths. The first path, through action 
monitoring and regret, led if-then action planners to be more likely to set future study time goals. 
Bias-corrected bootstrapped confidence intervals (10,000 samples) confirmed that this indirect 
path through regret was significant for the if-then action condition (β = .0239, Lower CI: .0025, 
Upper CI: .0686). The second path, through action mitoring and outcome expectancies, led if-
then action planners to be less likely to pursue an ambitious study time goal for their final exam. 
This indirect path was also significant (β = -.0250, Lower CI: -.0834, Upper CI: -.0010). 
Some readers may note that the path between setting an if-then action plan and action 
monitoring was marginal (p = .064). The significance of an indirect effect is determined by 
whether its bootstrapped confidence interval is different from 0, regardless of whether hypothesis 
tests for constituent paths are significant individually (Hayes 2009, 2013). As 0 is not included in 
the confidence interval for the if-then action condition, the indirect effect is significant.  
The total effect of setting an if-then action plan, observing one’s performance, and then 
deciding how to proceed for a future goal was null for if-then action planners – they were less 
likely to set ambitious study goals for the final exam (MIT-ACT = 1.00, SDIT-ACT = 1.71) versus 
participants in the control condition (MCTRL = 1.39, SDCTRL = 1.50), but this difference was not 
significant (β = -.20, t(231), = -1.25, p = .21). However, despite this seemingly null effect, by 
examining the combination of the indirect and direct effects, we reveal valuable information that 
seems likely to help improve planning interventions. Note that this total X-Y effect is the sum of 
the direct and indirect effects (Hayes 2013). Here, we uncovered the presence of two indirect 





influence on if-then planners’ likelihood of setting future ambitious study goals. The second, 
through action monitoring and outcome expectancies, ha  a negative influence on the same 
outcome. Taken together, these effects serve to oppse each other, weakening the total X-Y 
relationship between setting an if-then action plan focused on how to cope with obstacles and 
intentions to pursue the goal on subsequent opportunities. 
In contrast, the link between action monitoring and setting a when-where-how (βWWH =    
-.07, t(231) = -.49, p = .62) or if-then inaction plan (βIT-INACT = -.09, t(231) = -.59, p = .56) did 
not differ from control, causing non-significant ind rect effects in these conditions for both regret 
and outcome expectancies. Confidence intervals for these paths may be found in FIGURE 1.3. 
---INSERT FIGURE 1.3 ABOUT HERE--- 
 In addition to the results described above, we also performed supplemental analyses to 
target the nature of participants’ emotional respones. In addition to the amount of regret they 
felt about their level of goal achievement, participants also reported their regret over the study 
goal that they set and the plan that they constructed. Substituting these measures into the model 
in place of the achievement regret item caused the indirect path to be non-significant for the if-
then action condition, as neither goal regret nor plan regret were associated with changes in 
future goal intentions (βINCLUDING GOAL REGRET = .0048, LLCI: -.0008, ULCI: .0252, βINCLUDING 
PLAN REGRET = .0024, LLCI: -.0019, ULCI: .0160)6. This pattern indicates that the downstream 
impact of participants’ regret is centered on perceived deficiencies in their performance, and not 
because they feel that they have set bad goals or bad plans. We also asked participants to 
consider a set of other emotions in regard to their p rformance (“When you think about how you 
                                                 
 





studied for this quiz, how do you feel right now?” 0 = “not at all”, 6 = “very much”). We 
combined the negative emotions (α = .93) and positive emotions (α = .84) into indices and 
inserted them in place of regret in the serial model (see APPENDIX 1.3). Negative emotions 
yielded similar results to performance regret – exerting a positive influence on future intentions, 
though the path from outcome expectancies to intentions fell short of significance – while 
positive emotions did not. We chose to focus upon regret as the main focus of our investigation 
because its characteristics – its counterfactual nature and focus on actions that have been 
committed (or foregone) by the self – make it the most theoretically appropriate emotion for this 
setting. However, the experience of other negative emotions, particularly self-conscious feelings 
such as self-directed anger, disappointment, and guilt, also may hold promise for future 
investigations. 
Discussion  
Study 2 yields three important insights. First, in line with the differences in content that 
were observed in Study 1, plan format matters. Participants who made if-then action plans were 
more likely to conclude that they had coped less well ith obstacles, while we did not observe 
this effect for when-where-how or if-then inaction participants who set plans that should have 
allowed them to pivot away from such failings.  
A second insight gained from this study is that this change in how if-then action planners 
evaluated their actions generated two indirect processes leading to regret about performance and 
to shifts in outcome expectancies. If-then action planners felt more regret, which was motivating 
– it prompted increased intentions to study hard fo the final examination, compared to control 
participants who set no plan. On the other hand, they also felt less likely to be able to achieve 





compared to control. Together, these indirect effects worked against each other, causing the 
appearance of a null effect.  However, revealing their presence has much practical and theoretical 
value, as we outline below.  
Consider that the presence of these indirect paths occurred in the absence of a significant 
direct or total X-Y effect. Methodologists agree that a significant total effect, which consists of 
the sum of the direct effect and all indirect effects, is not necessary to demonstrate a relationship 
between the independent variable, a set of mediating variables, and the dependent variable (see 
Mathieu and Taylor 2006; Hayes 2009, 2013; Zhao, Lynch Jr., and Chen 2010; Rucker et al. 
2011 for excellent summaries on the topic). The only criterion to establish the presence of an 
indirect effect is the significance of the path betw en the independent variable (in our case, 
planning), the mediators (action monitoring, regret, and outcome expectancy) and the dependent 
variable (future intentions to act; Hayes 2009; Zhao et al. 2010). Indeed, the presence of such 
indirect effects provides fertile ground to uncover additional previously hidden effects which can 
yield valuable insight into underlying processes (Hayes 2009; Zhao et al. 2010). This highlights 
the need to take a finer-grained look at the level of psychological processes – measuring only 
goal achievement or future intentions would have masked these indirect processes which indeed 
affected the ongoing goal pursuit of individuals who set if-then action plans. 
Finally, a third insight gathered from this study con erns the implications for theory and 
practice.  In this context, regret strengthened participants’ intentions to continue to pursue the 
goal. By modifying planning interventions to strengthen the sting of regret, participants may be 
induced to try harder next time. Further, weakening the link between perceptions of how well 





critical to helping people to keep pushing toward their objectives. We present further detail on 
strategies that consumers and companies may wish to use in the General Discussion. 
While the findings from the academic achievement field study were encouraging, a 
follow-up investigation is useful for a few reasons. First, we did not have an opportunity to 
observe subsequent performance after the monitoring period (i.e., how much time did students 
study for the upcoming final exam?), as the in-class setting provided only limited access to 
participants. Second, our participant population in th s study was relatively homogeneous. Our 
respondents were students in a selective undergraduate b siness program; they are all 
experienced (and successful) at attempting academic goals and attaining positive outcomes. A 
sample with a greater diversity of experience would allow us to examine the impact of this 
variable on the planning process. Finally, we sought to generalize our findings to a different type 






STUDY 3: PURSUING A PHYSICAL FITNESS GOAL 
In Study 3, we tested the process uncovered in Study 2 in a different self-regulatory 
domain: exercise behavior. Exercising regularly is another goal that people frequently intend to 
achieve – U.S. consumers were projected to spend over $81 million in 2014 on the tools of the 
trade (IBISWorld 2014) – but one where success is often elusive and short-lived. The context for 
this study was a six-week physical fitness program, providing insight into the mechanisms 
driving the effect of plans over time in a setting with excellent external validity. Further, we 
capitalized upon the diversity of the available participant pool to test the moderating role of task 
experience.  
Participants and Method 
Respondents were recruited from “Exercise!” (“E!”; program name disguised for 
confidentiality), a fitness promotion program at a large U.S. university, in exchange for the 
chance to win a gift card. E! is a 6-week program avail ble to all University faculty, staff, and 
students. Participants set physical activity goals and recorded their weekly exercise minutes 
using an online tracker. Recruiting for this study occurred via an email invitation to all 
University-affiliated E! members containing a link to the study, and any member who received 
the email could participate. We analyzed a subset of participants according to the following 
criteria.  
First, because there was a large degree of variability in the exercise minutes reported by 
participants who clicked the link in the study invitat on (as one would expect in a self-guided 
exercise program in a population with a diverse commit ent and ability to exercise), to reduce 
the impact of outliers we Winsorized the exercise minute distributions for each of the four weeks 





extreme point in the distribution equal to the closest observation (Tukey 1962; Chen and Dixon 
1972); for each week we set values above the 99th percentile of minutes exercised equal to the 
99th percentile and values below the 1st percentile equal to the 1st percentile. These values are 
summarized in TABLE 1.2. Second, E! participants may join the program as part of a team or as 
an individual. Some participants also opt-in to a more guided version of the E! program, where 
they are urged to increase their physical activity over time. To maintain consistency with Study 2 
and avoid contamination from these factors, we restricted the analysis sample to participants who 
joined the program as individuals or who indicated that they always exercised alone (vs. with 
team members) and who did not indicate that they opted-in to the guided track. Third, to 
maintain consistency of the analysis sample over time, we only included participants in the 
analysis who reported in all four weeks of interest (baseline, Week 3, Week 5, and Week 6), who 
completed matched responses for both waves of the surv y, and who provided responses to all 
the items in the models below. Four-hundred ninety-nine participants remained eligible for 
analysis. 
The experiment proceeded as follows: Week 1 served as a baseline measure of exercise 
performance before any study contact. At the start of Week 2, participants were asked to 
consider their exercise for the upcoming week (Week 3) and were reminded to look at the 
exercise time goal that they had set in the E! program. We collected measures of goal intentions 
since some participants sign up for E! but display minimal commitment to achieving program 
objectives (these measures are found in APPENDIX 1.4). Participants were then randomly 
assigned to one of four conditions.  
In the control condition, participants pursued their goal naturalistically with no direction 





and reviewed an example of two if-then plans for an unrelated goal (eating a healthy diet). 
Participants then specified one to four obstacles that could arise as they were pursuing the goal to 
exercise and they completed each plan statement by writing a corresponding action. In the when-
where-how condition, participants saw instructions a d a similar healthy eating example 
structured in a when-where-how format, and then they specified one to four actions that they 
could take as steps to move toward their goal. Participants completed each plan statement by 
elaborating on when, where, how, and for how long each step would take place. Finally, we 
introduced a fourth condition – hybrid plans – as an exploratory attempt to produce a more 
consistent and effective method of planning adapted from the principles contained in the Project 
Management Book of Knowledge (Project Management Institute 2008), an industry guide for 
project management professionals. We wanted participants to form plans that included elements 
of both steps and obstacles, and to integrate both of those pieces together rather than considering 
actions in isolation. Participants saw instructions a d an example of this type of plan for an 
unrelated healthy eating goal. Then they were asked to specify one to two broad categories of 
steps that they would take to pursue their exercise tim  goal. For example, a participant might 
list, “cardio exercise,” or, “staying motivated.” The rationale behind first listing categories is to 
encourage participants to think broadly about what t ey need to do to achieve the goal. 
Participants then elaborated upon each of these categories by specifying what specific actions 
they would take for each category, and by whom (e.g. on their own, with friends, etc.), how, 
when/for how long, and where the action would be excuted. Hybrid participants then specified 
one to two obstacles that they thought might arise during goal pursuit, and an associated action 
using an if-then format. Lastly, participants ordered all of their plan statements (both steps and 





did not yield results different from setting no plan. Consequently and because it was not the main 
focus of our investigation, it will not be discussed further, though the results of the hybrid 
condition are summarized in FIGURE 1.4. Plans were summarized for participants at the end of 
the intervention and participants were asked to internalize them. They were also emailed a copy 
as a reminder. The Week 2 survey also included items measuring intentions and expectations for 
exercise in Week 3, and demographic items. Participants then received a follow-up survey in 
Week 4. Participants who formed plans were reminded of them and were asked whether they had 
the opportunity to carry out each action and whether t y actually did so. Participants then gave 
a subjective assessment of their performance over Week 3, indicated an emotional response, and 
provided measurements of how well they carried out steps and overcame obstacles. We then 
collected intentions / expectations for future weeks of exercise. At the end of E!, we received 
individualized data from the online tracker for all six weeks of the program. Measures used in 
the following model are found in APPENDIX 1.4.  
Results 
To account for individual natural differences in commitment to E! program goals and to 
the desire/ability to exercise, we controlled for gal intentions (measures summarized in 
APPENDIX 1.4) and minutes of exercise in the baseline week. As in the academic achievement 
study, an ANOVA with planned contrasts revealed no effect of implementation intentions on 
minutes exercised for the week immediately following the planning manipulation, compared to 





p = .48; MWWH = 286.45, SEWWH = 9.74, FWWH-CTRL (1, 493) = .44, p = .51)7. Following Study 2, 
we estimated a serial multiple mediator regression m del (Hayes 2013; Hayes and Preacher 
2014) to evaluate the effect of setting plans on exercise for the week after the follow-up survey 
(Week 5); we expected that the indirect process that influenced studying behavior over time to 
also contribute to the number of minutes that participants exercised.  
Recall that, as the first step in this model, we prdicted the inflexibility inherent in 
obstacle coping plans would negatively influence the evaluation of the actions that were and 
were not carried out in service of the goal. In Study 2, we found that setting if-then plans reduced 
evaluations of how well participants coped with obstacles they tried to overcome during goal 
pursuit. However, in that study we did not ask about how well participants enacted steps. We 
predicted that the same inability to pivot outside th  bounds of the plan and corresponding 
reduced evaluations for participants who formed coping lans would apply to later judgments 
about both obstacles and steps; the critical point is that forming an obstacle-focused coping plan 
narrows one’s cognitive focus to situations to execut  in-plan means, to the detriment of other 
possible goal-consistent but unplanned opportunities. Indeed, the items for facilitative actions 
and obstacle coping were highly associated (α = .89), so we averaged them for further analysis.  
Using this combined measure, if-then planners report d that they did a worse job of 
acting in service of the goal, compared to control (βIT-STEP/OBST = -.18, t(493) = -2.06, p = .04). 
As in the academic achievement study, this perceived shortcoming led to a corresponding 
increase in regret about goal performance – in this case, the number of minutes exercised during 
Week 3 (β = -.56, t(492) = -14.32, p < .001). In turn, regret led to a decrease in future outcome 
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expectancy – participants estimated that they had a lower chance of achieving their future 
exercise goals (β = -2.57, t(491) = -5.43, p < .001), which resulted in participants exercising for 
fewer minutes during Week 5 (β = 1.12, t(490) = 2.74, p = .01). Bias-corrected bootstrapping 
(10,000 samples; 95% confidence intervals) confirmed that this indirect path was significant for 
if-then planners, versus control (β = -.2945, Lower CIIT: -1.0053, Upper CIIT: -.0440). 
Interestingly, the indirect effect continued to influence exercise time for if-then planners in Week 
6, revealing that plans guided habits for these participants over the rest of the program (see 
FIGURE 1.5). 
These results represent an indirect-only mediation (Zhao et al. 2010) in a similar pattern 
to Study 2, with some key differences. While the total effect of setting an if-then plan was not 
significant, again we see evidence of opposing processes at work that mask the effects of setting 
if-then plans (see FIGURE 1.4). Overall, if-then planners exercised for more minutes (MIT = 
279.66, SEIT = 10.91) than control participants (MCTRL = 262.84, SECTRL = 10.37), which 
represented a non-significant difference (β = 8.41, t(493) = 1.12, p = .26)8. However, this effect 
is composed of the significant indirect effect we have described above, which has a negative 
effect on minutes exercised, and a marginal direct effect from X-Y (β = 11.58, t(490)=1.58 = 
.11), which has a positive effect on minutes exercis d, holding the indirect path constant. In other 
words, the two paths oppose each other. Thus, the effect of setting if-then plans on the number of 
minutes exercised should be strengthened if the negativ  indirect path through action monitoring, 
regret, and changes in outcome expectancy were to breduced, either by changing the nature of 
regret or outcome expectancies. Unlike in Study 2, in this context there emerged a significant 
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and negative link between regret and outcome expectancy – as regret increased, outcome 
expectancy decreased. Below, we outline experience as a key reason driving this this difference. 
As in Study 2, when-where-how planners displayed no changes in their evaluations of 
past actions compared to control (βWWH-STEP/OBST = -.11, t(493) = -1.29, p = .20); as a result, the 
indirect path was not significant (β = -.1792, Lower CIWWH: -.7006, Upper CIIT: .0265; see 
FIGURE 1.4).  
Finally, the properties of regret again make it the most theoretically appropriate emotion 
to include in the model. However, we also collected other measures to further hone in on 
participants’ emotional response. In addition to regret, participants were also asked to report how 
much they felt happy, fulfilled, satisfied, determined to improve, and as though they wished they 
could change the situation in regard to their exercis  performance. Consistent with the results of 
Study 2, the positive emotions did not yield significant indirect effects when inserted in place of 
regret, as they were not related to participants’ expectations of the future. Similarly, the path 
including “determined to improve” failed to reach significance. However, consistent with the 
experience of regret as an emotion rooted in counterfactual thought, the indirect path including 
“Wishing I could change the situation” in place of regret was also significant. Results of these 
supplemental analyses may be found in APPENDIX 1.5. 
 
---INSERT FIGURE 1.4 ABOUT HERE--- 
Task experience moderates the link between regret and outcome expectancy  
Across both field studies, related indirect processes emerged. Setting when-where-how 
plans, which focused on facilitative actions, did not impact participants’ assessments of their 





that they did a worse job at coping with obstacles (in Study 2) and a worse job at coping with 
both obstacles and executing facilitative steps (in Study 3). This recognition of substandard 
performance produced regret about the level of achievement in service of the goal. However, this 
regret had different consequences depending on the cont xt. In the academic achievement study, 
regret did not feed into reduced expectations about the future and it had a positive influence on 
intentions to study for a subsequent exam. Conversely, in the E! study, regret spurred if-then 
planners to report lower outcome expectancies about their chances for future goal achievement, 
exerting a downward influence on performance. 
What could account for this difference, given the similar process findings shared across 
both studies? Consider that experience may play an important role, and one that is worthy of 
continued scrutiny. The participants in the academic achievement study were veteran students, 
having spent the majority of their lives in formal education. It is highly likely that most of them 
recognize the inevitability of some academic setbacks, and they are used to “bouncing back.” 
Conversely, E! participants are a mix of veterans and relative rookies – respondents reported 
participating between 0 and more than 10 previous times (M = 3.59, SD = 2.97). We predicted 
that those with less experience should be more likely to believe that the deficiencies made salient 
by plans are more permanent or indicative of ability, reducing outcome expectancies. 
Thus, we conducted a conditional process analysis (Hayes 2013; also commonly referred 
to as a “moderated mediation”) to determine whether t  relationship between regret, outcome 
expectancies, and future performance was moderated by the number of prior times a participant 
had completed the E! program. Specifically, we predict  that the link between regret and 
reduced outcome expectancies would be stronger for less experienced participants, compared to 





we extracted the relevant variables and ran the conditi al process component separately, using 
regret as the independent variable, outcome expectancy as the mediator, Week 5 exercise 
minutes as the DV, and experience as the moderator of he path between regret and outcome 
expectancy. The preceding variables in the serial mediation model (plan type and behavior 
monitoring) were entered as covariates so that the regression equation for the dependent variable 
(Week 5 minutes) matched that of the serial model and the regression equation for the regret 
mediator matched the serial model, with the addition of the experience main effect and the regret 
by experience interaction. We also continued to control for baseline exercise minutes and goal 
intentions.  
The conditional process analysis confirmed moderation by experience (see FIGURE 1.6). 
The interaction of regret and experience on outcome exp ctancy was significant (β = .35, t(489) 
= 2.40, p = .02.  For participants 1SD below the mean and at the mean of previous E! 
participation occasions, regret led to reduced outcome expectancies and minutes exercised for 
Week 5, as described above (β -1SD = -3.9996, Lower CI -1SD = -7.7399, Upper CI -1SD = -1.5188; 
β MEAN = -2.8345, Lower CI MEAN = -6.2640, Upper CI MEAN = -.8677). Conversely, for E! 
veterans 1 standard deviation above the mean, this path was not significant (β +1SD = -1.6693, 
Lower CI +1SD = -5.6611, Upper CI +1SD = .2597). The index of moderated mediation was also
significant (β = .3913, LLCI: .0257, ULCI: .9564), indicating tha the conditional effects for any 
two values of the moderator differ from each other (Hayes 2015). Further, note that the 
coefficients of the indirect path are less negative as xperience rises. In other words, with more 
experience, regret led to less of a drop in outcome expectancies. As additional evidence of the 
role of experience in the link between regret and outc me expectancy, further analysis using a 





expectancy link was significant for respondents who had participated in the E! program 
approximately 7 times or fewer (specifically, 6.9313 times), but not for those with more 
experience, with the coefficients consistently becoming less negative (and positive for those who 
have participated in E! for more than 10 prior occasions). This mirrors the pattern observed 
between regret and outcome expectancy in Study 2. Following the trend for the current analysis, 
the relationship there between regret and outcome exp ctancy was positive for the student 
participants (all of whom are very experienced at pursuing study goals), though it similarly did 
not reach significance (β = .09, t(229) = 1.47, p = .14).  
Thus, we see preliminary evidence that experience moderates the observed link between 
regret and future goal intentions and actions. For novices who have few times in the past when 
they have pursued the goal, the current attempt garners much weight in developing expectations 
for how the future will unfold – for example, if one has only been an E! participant for a short 
while, feeling regretful over failures to execute one’s intentions seem more likely to lead to 
thoughts like, “I feel bad…maybe this isn’t for me.” Thus, regret leads those individuals to 
expect worse performance in the future and exerts a neg tive effect on their upcoming 
progression toward the goal. In contrast, for those who possess more experience and, in turn, 
have more events to input into a forecast of future goal pursuit – for example, students who have 
many years of preparing for tests and exams under their belt – the impact of the current attempt 
is reduced and regret may spur the individual to push harder to achieve the goal. 
 






Thus, in two diverse settings with consequential gols, setting implementation intentions 
led to a set of intriguing findings. By examining the goal pursuit process at multiple time points 
both before and after performance feedback, once mor  we observed the influence of an indirect 
process masking the effects of plans over time, as individuals reflected upon their actions and 
considered the implications for future performance. 
Again, feeling as though one had not lived up to the means outlined in the plan led if-then 
planners to reduce their overall evaluations of perormance and express regret over the 
deficiency. Here, this regret was often damaging – it led to a reduced expectation that success 
would occur in the next week, and subsequently to a reduction in exercise behavior.  This 
process persisted through week six of the program, suggesting that its effect was enduring. 
However, the sting of regret did not appear to impact everyone in the same way. 
Consistent with the regret literature (Inman 2007), across Studies 2 and 3, regret had both 
motivating and demotivating consequences, depending upon the individual’s degree of 
experience with the goal. For novices, the regret that comes from recognizing deficient 
performance can be damaging, leading to reduced outcome expectancies and action. 
While the role of experience is an interesting and exciting addition to the larger process 
model, from these analyses, we cannot definitively conclude that the entire indirect path from 
plan type to minutes exercised was moderated by experience, as the moderation tested only the 
link between regret, outcome expectancy, and exercise minutes. The selection of this particular 
portion of the model was driven by extant theory, but it would be instructive to confirm that the 
moderation affects the entire indirect path, and efforts to do so are ongoing. To further examine 
the generality of these findings in addition to thevariables in the main model, we also conducted 





Further, other factors besides experience may have also accounted for the differing role 
of regret. For example, participants in Study 2 were pursuing a goal (studying) for which the 
ultimate goal (performance on an evaluation) is somewhat difficult to escape, with short-term 
and salient consequences for poor performance. In contrast, participants in Study 3 were 
pursuing a goal (exercising) associated with more lng-term and delayed consequences (e.g. 
general health, feeling good, weight loss, etc.), where giving up is easier. It is possible that regret 
is more likely to lead to a facilitative response like, “I have to do better next time, or else,” in the 
former context while it may be more likely to cause reduced future expectations in the latter 
(“I’m not going to be able to exercise enough, maybe this program isn’t for me.”). We plan to 
investigate this explanation in future work. 
Unfortunately, hybrid plans did not lead to improved performance in service of the goal. 
We are continuing to refine the concept of hybrid plans and leave broader conclusions about 
them to future research. 
Finally, in both field studies, we observed no differences in the performance of when-
where-how planners versus control, suggesting that considering steps likely occurs naturally for 
the types of goals that we studied, stronger manipulations are needed, or different processes 







This research makes two major contributions to the li erature on planning, goals, and self-
regulation that contribute to our understanding of why sometimes plans work and sometimes 
they do not. First, we demonstrate that different types of plans focus individuals on different 
means to achieve their goals. To date, plan format has received little attention in the literature, 
and different types of implementation intentions have largely been considered to be equivalent. 
However, we demonstrate that participants who set if-then plans are more likely to consider 
ways to overcome obstacles, while participants who set when-where-how plans focus more 
intently on facilitative actions. This difference in content is critically important, as the means 
identified in the plan should guide action as goal pursuit is underway. 
Our second contribution illuminates a previously underexamined mechanism linking 
implementation intentions and long-term success. Most work on planning has focused on goal 
achievement as the critical outcome, often in the short-term. However, little attention has been 
paid to indirect processes – in this case, how plans alter the subjective experience of goal pursuit 
and how this experience changes engagement with the goal over time – or not. Indeed, the 
complex and consequential contexts studied in this paper – shopping for loved ones, professional 
achievement, and personal health – seem most likelyto generate a diverse set of cognitions and 
feelings that would lead to such processes compared to more peripheral goals. By studying them, 
we more thoroughly approximate how such interventions might work in real consumer contexts. 
The process model that we propose and validate – that plans which focus individuals on 
obstacles hinder flexibility in the goal monitoring process, leading to regret, changes in outcome 
expectancy, and performance over time – adds significa tly to our understanding of how 





behavior. Specifically, if-then coping plans which make it more likely that individuals will 
perceive deficiencies in their goal-directed actions also cause an increase in regret. This regret 
can be motivating when experience with the goal is quite high, but feeds into reduced outcome 
expectancies when experience is low. Further, these p rceived action deficiencies can also 
impact outcome expectancies directly, making individuals believe that future success is less 
likely. 
As a result, these findings contribute to the small but growing literature showing 
inconsistent or harmful effects of implementation intentions (e.g. Bayuk et al. 2010; Dalton and 
Spiller 2012; Townsend and Liu 2012) by illuminating previously unstudied paths that can 
hinder or facilitate the success of planning. In particular, our results build upon Townsend and 
Liu’s (2012) discovery that the concrete nature of planning creates a link between planning, a 
general sense of emotional distress, and future action when the distance to achieve the goal is 
large. We complement this foundation by further investigating the role of a discrete emotion – 
regret – and demonstrating that the resulting action can contribute to either the hindrance or 
facilitation of goal achievement, depending on task experience. Indeed, it seems likely that 
novices would be most likely to have a large gap betwe n their present state and successful 
achievement of the goal. Likewise, our results are also consistent with Dalton and Spiller’s 
(2012) finding that planning makes salient the difficulty of achieving multiple goals, 
undermining performance. Though we did not inquire about other goals, it is likely that 
participants in our field contexts were also pursuing other responsibilities; indeed, the novices 
who experienced performance decreases in our studie also seem most prone to perceive 
difficulty balancing multiple goals. Our results illuminate an additional, novel process for the 






Recently, Ordóñez and her colleagues (2009) issued a “warning label” for goal setting, 
arguing that when companies and managers indiscriminately set specific, challenging goals for 
employees, a number of unintended side effects can o cur. Rather than thinking of goals as an 
“over-the-counter” remedy for organizational challeng s, Ordóñez et al. argue that companies 
should dispense goals as “prescriptions,” and be mindful that sometimes their use can cause 
harm as well as benefit. It appears apt to apply similar practical recommendations to 
implementation intentions.  
Overall, planning is often beneficial, but its efficacy would be enhanced by following 
three sets of recommendations. First, using if-then pla s to invoke thoughts about how to cope 
with obstacles and prompt increased monitoring of behavior yields the most significant impact in 
terms of the potential for behavioral change, at lest in terms of the contexts and processes that 
we have outlined here. Indeed, this is consistent with people’s natural tendency to consider steps 
but not how to cope with obstacles (e.g. Buehler et al. 1994). However, interventions such as 
when-where-how plans which guide the user to consider steps may prove to be more beneficial 
in situations that are completely novel or daunting, where there may be a natural tendency to 
think of the obstacles one faces and where there is a real need to elaborate upon how to “get from 
point A to point B.” For example, someone who has devoted little attention to saving for 
retirement and as a consequence is starting to save in middle-age may naturally think of all the 
obstacles that they will face as they try to accumulate sufficient funds in the upcoming years and 
think insufficiently about concrete steps to reach the goal. In this case, a when-where-how plan 






 Second, we observed that regret can yield motivation l benefits for those with task 
experience, but feeds into reduced outcome expectancies for inexperienced people. What seems 
needed is a way to help novices to derive the same motivational benefits from regret as people 
with more experience. Part of the problem may be that some consumers specify elements in their 
plans that are unrealistic or not germane to achieving their goals. After experiencing setbacks, 
people may look to these poorly formed plans as evidence that they do not have a good 
understanding of the goal, when in fact what is needed is to change the plan. It appears 
reasonable to believe that novices would be more susceptible to forming plans that are unfocused 
or too difficult to achieve. Indeed, this seems particularly true in the if-then condition, where 
participants are asked to start by thinking of a scenario where action might be necessary. If one’s 
experience with the goal is limited, thinking about possibilities that might arise (in particular, 
obstacles, which the planning fallacy literature and our own data tell us people do not frequently 
consider) is likely to be quite challenging (see also Sniehotta et al. 2005). Firms or organizations 
that wish to influence consumer planning (e.g. a mortgage lender providing guidance to 
homeowners on repaying their loan) should consider that consumers likely have a broad range of 
experience levels and they should tailor their materi ls accordingly. For example, firms may 
wish to provide a version of a planning tool for novices where plans are pre-selected for 
consumers or they select options from a menu of possible alternatives to ensure that appropriate 
plans are being formulated.  
Third, it seems critical to re-frame the link between perceptions of poor past performance 
and outcome expectancy such that people do not conclude that current setbacks make future 
success less likely. To do so, it may be appropriate to reassure that some setbacks are a normal 





spends a bit of extra time in bed rather than being at the gym), that feelings of regret over those 
missed opportunities should not necessarily be interpreted as a sign of poor future performance 
or ability, and that competency with the goal is built over a period of time. Such an intervention 
might involve pairing planning interventions with a manipulation to encourage participants 
toward representing their goals as reflecting an opportunity to learn and build mastery over time 
rather than as a performance-oriented reflection of their abilities (Elliott and Dweck 1988). 
Limitations 
While these findings represent an interesting and important step toward a more complete 
understanding of the processes underlying implementatio  intentions, they have some 
shortcomings. First, we revealed an indirect process that works through behavior monitoring, 
regret, outcome expectancies, and future action. This process is likely to also be accompanied by 
other complementary and competitive processes which remain a topic for future research. 
Second, though the data in the two field studies were collected in real settings with consequential 
goals, they remain self-report measures. We did not directly observe participants’ studying time 
or exercise time, in an attempt to allow participants to pursue their goals in a setting that was 
naturalistic. While there exists the possibility of participants over-reporting their goal 
achievement, observation data may also suffer from participants acting differently because they 
know they are being observed (i.e. through the Hawthorne Effect). Third, it is possible that the 
observed effects could be explained by other factors that were not included in our model; for 
example, plans across conditions were different lengths, which may impact elaboration or 
memory processes. However, evidence against this notion is provided by the if-then inaction 





reveal the hypothesized path as a result. Thus, elaboration or memory effects are unlikely to 
explain the results.  
Future directions  
The type of goal at hand may also moderate the impact of our process model. In addition 
to the implications discussed above, some goals also provide more immediate opportunities to 
monitor success or failure. The effects of goals like exercising or studying take time to develop – 
after a run or a study session it is not clear whether hose actions have caused a positive result. 
Thus, room exists for plans to increase monitoring. Conversely, goals like gambling or 
responding to the presence of stimuli (e.g. words on a screen) provide quick performance 
feedback. Here, plans are unlikely to facilitate additional behavior monitoring as the outcome is 
immediately apparent.  
In sum, implementation intentions represent a promising tool for consumers and 
managers. However, we agree with Dalton and Spiller (2012) that their role in complex settings 
remains somewhat equivocal. Part of the problem is that researchers have been unsystematic in 
teaching consumers how to form plans, leading to changes in plan content. Second, the literature 
has devoted insufficient attention to indirect processes that help to explain and elaborate upon 
previously-found mechanisms. In contexts with complex and consequential goals, examining 
processes like monitoring and regret provides valuable theoretical and practical insight on how 
implementation intentions change the ways consumers fe l and act during goal pursuit. We hope 
that our findings provide new explanations for self-r gulation based on planning and point the 















FIGURE 1.2 OBSTACLE COPING PLANS AS A PROPORTION OF PLAN 



























































































































FIGURE 1.6: CONDITIONAL PROCESS ANALYSIS FOR MODERA TION BY 






Experience β  Confidence interval  
(Lower : Upper; 95%) 
   
-1SD -3.9996 -7.7399 : -1.5188 * 
   
Mean -2.8345 -6.2640 : -.8677 * 
   












TABLE 1.1: EXAMPLES OF OBSTACLE COPING PLANS AND ST EP PLANS SHOWN 
TO PARTICIPANTS - STUDY 1 
 
 Obstacle coping plan 
example 
 
Step plan example 
 
If-then If an item that I need to buy is 
out of stock, then I will use 
shopping apps on my phone 
while I’m at home to search 
for it at multiple retailers 
 
If it’s 5 pm and I am leaving 
campus, then I will take the 
bus to Briarwood Mall to 
shop for an hour for my 
family 
When-where-how WHAT: Search for an item at 
multiple retailers 
 
WHEN: An item that I need 
to buy is out of stock 
 
WHERE: At home 
 
HOW: By using shopping 
apps on my phone 
 
FOR HOW LONG: Until I 
have all my gifts purchased 
 
WHAT: Go to the mall to 
shop for my family 
 
WHEN: At 5 pm, as I am 
leaving campus 
 
WHERE: Briarwood Mall 
 
HOW: Take the bus there 
 
FOR HOW LONG: An hour 
If-then reversed I will use shopping apps on 
my phone while I’m at home 
to search for an item at 
multiple retailers if the item 
that I need to buy is out of 
stock 
 
I will take the bus to 
Briarwood Mall to shop for 
an hour for my family if it is 
5 pm and I am leaving 
campus 
Free plan I will use shopping apps on 
my phone while I’m at home 
to search for out of stock 
products at multiple retailers 
I will take the bus to 
Briarwood Mall to shop for 
an hour for my family as I am 
leaving campus at 5 pm 
 
NOTE: These are the same examples that were presented to participants. The order for 








TABLE 1.2: REPORTED MINUTES EXERCISED BY WEEK - STU DY 3 
 
 Week 1 Week 3 Week 5 Week 6 
Mean 245.74 264.81 266.10 257.97 
Minimum / Maximum 0 / 1079 0 / 1590 20 / 2350 10 / 2330 
1st percentile 30 30 40 30 
99th percentile 870 930.30 937.10 895.77 




































APPENDIX 1.1: PLANNING INSTRUMENTS AND MEASURES - STUDY 1 












In addition to the measures described above and in the main body of the paper, participants 
judged how effective their plan would be at helping them to finish their shopping, generated 
alternate situations in which they could use their plan, and judged the ease of doing so. They also 
answered items on their typical shopping behaviors and intentions to complete shopping this 
year, chronic regulatory focus orientation (based on L ckwood, Jordan, and Kunda 2002), 
elaboration on potential outcomes (Nenkov, Inman, and Hulland 2008), an attention check, and 








APPENDIX 1.2: ITEMS INCLUDED IN SERIAL MEDIATION MO DEL - STUDY 2 
 
Action monitoring  
• How well did you overcome obstacles that prevented you from studying? (7-pt scale; 1 = 
“Not at all well” to 7 = “Very well”) 
Regret (all 7-pt scales; 0 = “Not at all” to 6 = “Very much”) 
• How much do you regret your level of achievement on y ur study time goal? 
• How much do you regret setting your study time goal? 
• How much do you regret the plans you set to achieve that study time goal? 
Outcome expectancy  
• How likely are you to achieve that study time goal f r your final exam? (7-pt scale, 1 = 
very unlikely, 7 = very likely) 
• Note: Much work (e.g. Bandura 1977) has drawn a distinction between outcome 
expectancies and self-efficacy, defining the former as the belief that one’s actions will 
lead to a desired outcome and the latter as the beli f that one has the capability to 
successfully execute desired behaviors. To use an unrelated example of saving money to 
buy a home, an individual may believe or not believe that she is capable of executing 
contributory actions like bringing lunch to work or cutting utility bills (self-efficacy) and 
she may also make a judgment that these actions will or will not allow her to reach the 
outcome of saving the amount of money necessary to buy her chosen home (outcome 
expectancy). Both this measure and the similar measur  used in Study 3 focus primarily 
upon the participant’s assessment of whether or not the focal outcome will be achieved 
(i.e. whether the individual will achieve the goal to study or exercise for a particular 
amount of time). Thus, we argue that the measure is most accurately conceptualized as 
outcome expectancy. 
Future goal intentions 
• How likely are you to also set a challenging study time goal for your [class name / 
number] final exam? (7-pt scale; -3 = “Definitely unlikely,” 0 = “Fifty-fifty chance,”  3 = 
“Definitely likely”) 
In addition to the measures described above and in the main body of the paper, during Wave 1 
participants also completed items on their confidence about achieving their goal and doing well 
on the quiz, the importance of the quiz and studying, their prediction for their grade, their 
intentions and likelihood to study, how close they were to achieving their goal and doing well on 
the quiz, the ease of achieving their goal, and for participants in the planning conditions, their 





completed items on their judgment for how completely hey achieved their goal, whether they 
started earlier/later and studied more/less per day th n they intended, counterfactual judgments 
about how they acted while pursuing the study goal, how close they felt to achieving the goal 
while pursuing it, causal attributions and responsibility, the level of effort, productivity, and 
control participants experienced during goal pursuit, a grade prediction, the likelihood of future 
planning, and for participants in the planning conditions, whether their plan made it easier or 
harder to achieve the goal, and how closely participants followed the plan,. In Wave 3, 
participants completed measures of whether they followed through on their planned actions 
(though due to an error this measure was inconsistet across conditions), their feelings about 
their goal, plans, grade, and actions after receiving their grade, counterfactual judgments after 
receiving their quiz grade, their closeness to earning a good grade, attributions regarding their 
grade, how their grade compared to their ideals and expectations, the difficulty of the quiz, their 







APPENDIX 1.3: INDIRECT EFFECTS OF ADDITIONAL EMOTIO NS FOR IF-THEN / 






Negative emotions (α = .93, n = 234) Positive emotions (α = .84, n = 235) 
β = .0261, LLCI: .0036, ULCI: .0683 * β = .0058, LLCI: -.0050, ULCI: .0351 
Sad Happy 
Regretful Enthusiastic 







Analyses conducted with 10,000 bias-corrected bootstrapped samples and the same inclusion 
criteria as the main analyses. Sample sizes differ slightly between measures because of omitted 






APPENDIX 1.4: ITEMS INCLUDED IN SERIAL MEDIATION MO DEL - STUDY 3 
 
Goal intentions (α = .90; all 7-pt scales, anchors noted below) 
• How strong is your desire to achieve your E! personal exercise time goal? (“No desire at 
all”/“Extremely strong desire”) 
• Agree or disagree with the following statement (both “Strongly disagree”/“Strongly agree”) 
o "I want to achieve my personal exercise time goal" 
o "I have decided that I will try hard to achieve my personal exercise time goal”  
• How strong is your actual intention to achieve your E! personal exercise time goal? ( “No 
intention at all”/“Extremely strong intention”) 
Action monitoring (1 = “not at all well,” 7 = “very  well”) 
• Overall, how well did you overcome obstacles that prevented you from exercising during 
the period of [Week 3]? 
• Overall, how well did you carry out all the steps that you needed to do in order to 
exercise during the period of [Week 3]?   
Regret (0 = “not at all,” 3 = “moderately,” 6 = “very much”)  
Think about how you feel regarding the amount of time that you exercised when you were 
working toward your personal exercise time goal during the period of [Week 3]. How well do the 
following statements describe your feelings? (“Regretful” listed with “satisfied,” “fulfilled,” 
“happy,” “wishing I could change the situation,” and “determined to improve in the future.”)  
Outcome expectancies (0 = “0% chance,” 100 = “100% chance”) 
Using the slider below, give your best prediction fr whether you will exercise for enough time 
to achieve your personal exercise time goal during the period of [Week 5]. If you predict that you 
have a small chance of achieving your goal, slide the bar to the left. If you think you have a large 
chance of achieving your goal, slide the bar to the right. Slide the bar more toward the middle to 
reflect a moderate chance of achieving your goal. 
 
In addition to the measures described above, in Appendix 1.6, and in the main body of the paper, 
during Wave 1 participants also completed items about the likelihood of changing their future 
goals, the date that they predicted they would achieve their goal, an estimate of the amount of 
time they would need to do ancillary activities to prepare to exercise, causal attributions, their 
experience with and enjoyment of exercising, and demographics. During Wave 2, participants 
completed measures on whether they had changed their goals in the online tracker, their reasons 
for doing/not doing so, the likelihood of changing future goals, their judgment of how 





and expectation disconfirmation for their exercise performance, causal attributions, 
global/specific thinking, a prediction of the date when future goals would be achieved, self-
efficacy, and an estimate of the amount of time they would need to do ancillary activities to 






APPENDIX 1.5: INDIRECT EFFECTS OF ADDITIONAL EMOTIO NS FOR IF-THEN / 
CONTROL PLANNED CONTRAST – STUDY 3 
 
  
Wishing I could 
change the situation 
(n =  498) 
β = -.1266, LLCI: -.4961, ULCI: -.0099 * 
Determined to 
improve (n = 496) 
β = .0038, LLCI: -.0476, ULCI: .0758 
Fulfilled (n = 495) β = .0748, LLCI: -.0353, ULCI: .5128 
Happy (n = 497) β = .0390, LLCI: -.0830, ULCI: .4242 
Satisfied (n = 497) β = .0404, LLCI: -.0892, ULCI: .4388 
 
All analyses conducted with 10,000 bias-corrected bootstrapped samples, baseline exercise 
minutes and initial goal intentions as covariates, and the same inclusion criteria as the main 
analyses. Sample sizes differ slightly between measur s because of participants who omitted 







APPENDIX 1.6: ANALYSIS OF SUPPLEMENTARY VARIABLES –  STUDY 3 
 
We also conducted a series of supplementary analyses on variables not included in the 
main model to gauge the generality of the findings in Study 3. First, we substituted the dependent 
measure (minutes exercised in Week 5, a behavioral me sure) for the goal intentions that 
participants reported in reference to Week 5. While we felt that behavior was a more illuminating 
measure of the dynamic of goal pursuit, stated future goal intentions provide some additional 
information and further continuity with Study 2, where we did not have a behavioral measure for 
the participants’ opportunity to act. Using future goal intentions as the dependent measure 
yielded substantively identical results for the indirect path in the serial mediation model. The 
wording of the goal intention items was the same as found in APPENDIX 1.3 and they again 
demonstrated good internal consistency (α = .90). Four hundred ninety-five participants are 
included in this analysis as not all participants an wered all of the future goal intentions items. 
As before, baseline exercise minutes and initial gol intentions were included as covariates in the 
model. We will focus on the results for the if-then/control comparison below, as again when-
where-how respondents yielded a non-significant indirect path. If-then participants reported 
executing steps/coping with obstacles less well than participants who did not set a plan (β = -.19, 
t(489) = -2.08, p = .04). This led them to feel more regret over their p rformance (β = -.56, t(488) 
= -14.29, p < .001), which caused if-then planners to report a reduced likelihood of achieving 
their exercise goal for Week 5 (β = -2.58, t(487) = -5.44, p < .001). In turn, these expectancies 
reduced goal intentions for Week 5 (β = .02, t(486) = 8.64, p < .001). The indirect path was 
significant (β = -.0058, LLCI: -.0162, ULCI: -.0009). The direct effect did not approach 
significance (β = -.0036, t(486) = -.08, p = .94). Analysis of the moderating role of experienc  





.02) in a regression with outcome expectancy as the dep ndent variable, and a significant 
relationship between outcome expectancy and goal intentions (β = .02, t(486) = 8.64, p < .001). 
Analysis of the conditional indirect effect revealed that regret significantly reduced outcome 
expectancies and in turn future goal intentions for participants 1 SD below mean experience (β -
1SD = -.0772, LLCI = -.1270, ULCI: -.0406), and at the m an level of experience (β MEAN = -
.0547, LLCI = -.0946, ULCI: -.0261). As earlier, participants 1 SD above the mean level of 
experience yielded a non-significant path between th se variables (β = -.0322, LLCI: -.0791, 
ULCI: .0077). However, the confidence interval for the index of moderated mediation for the 
entire indirect path included 0 (β = .0075, LLCI: -.0005, ULCI: .0176). Thus, while the 
relationship between regret and outcome expectancy was again altered by experience (as noted 
by the presence of the significant interaction) andthe pattern of conditional indirect effects also 
matches those found in the main analyses, the presenc  of 0 in the confidence interval for the 
index of moderated mediation indicates that we cannot definitively conclude that the conditional 
indirect effects for the path between regret, outcome expectancy, and future intentions are 
different from each other at all levels of the moderator. Indeed, one might expect a somewhat 
weaker pattern of results for intentions as opposed to behavior, as people’s intentions are often 
miscalibrated compared to how they actually behave (indeed underscoring our desire to collect 
behavioral data in this study). 
 Second, we substituted two measures for the outcome expectancy variable. Participants 
were also asked to predict the number of minutes thy would exercise in Week 5 (“How many 
minutes do you predict that you will exercise during the period of [Week 5]”) and their 
confidence in their ability to meet their Week 5 goal (“Agree or disagree with the following 





time goal during the period of [Week 5]’”; 7 = “strongly disagree”, 1 = “strongly agree”). As a 
reminder, the outcome expectancy measure asked partici nts to judge the probability on a 1-
100% scale of their likelihood of achieving the future goal. While these measures are related to 
the outcome expectancy variable in the model, they ar  also somewhat different. The minutes 
prediction is a more deterministic (as opposed to probabilistic) judgment, and the confidence 
item measures a judgment that is more affective or f elings-based. Both substitute items yield 
similar results to our measure of outcome expectancy. Both analyses below again control for 
baseline exercise minutes and initial goal intentions to match the main set of results. Once more, 
we focus on the if-then condition as the when-where-how condition did not yield a significant 
indirect path for either substitute measure.  
For the predicted minutes variable, 499 responses were available for analysis. We 
Winsorized participants’ responses using the same procedure described in the main set of 
analyses. If-then participants judged that they did a worse job at enacting steps and carrying out 
obstacles compared to control (β = -.18, t(493) = -2.06, p = .04), which caused them to feel more 
regret (β = -.56, t(492) = -14.32, p < .001). In turn, this regret led to a decrease in the number of 
predicted exercise minutes for Week 5 (β = -6.73, t(491) = -1.93, p = .05) and this prediction was 
associated with fewer minutes exercised in Week 5 (β = .59, t(490) = 11.83, p < .001). As in the 
model with outcome expectancy, the indirect path was significant (β = -.4016, LLCI: -1.2872, 
ULCI: -.0197). However, unlike with outcome expectancy, experience did not moderate the link 
between regret and minutes predicted. The interaction of the experience variable and regret was 
not significant (β = -1.03, t(489) = -.96, p = .33) and the confidence interval for Hayes’ index of 
moderated mediation included 0 (β = -.6027, LLCI: -1.9930, ULCI: .5153). Thus, predicted 





of if-then plans over time, replicating the main set of analyses. However, the moderating role of 
experience on the impact of regret did not materialize. Indeed, it seems somewhat easier for 
novice participants to be able to judge their future likelihood of success versus the number of 
minutes they will exercise as the probabilistic judgment is more constrained and seems less 
subject to miscalibration. 
Finally, we substituted participants’ judgments of c nfidence in place of the outcome 
expectancy measure. Four hundred ninety-six participants were available for analysis due to 
three participants who did not complete the confidence item. Again, setting an if-then plan led 
participants to judge that they did a worse job at enacting steps and coping with obstacles (β = -
.18, t(490) = -2.04, p = .04), which led participants to feel more regret (β = -.55, t(489) = -14.25, 
p < .001). Regret was associated with lower confidence (β = -.08, t(488) = -2.89, p < .01), which 
resulted in fewer minutes exercised (β = 15.68, t(487) = 2.34, p = .02). The indirect effect for if-
then planners was significant (β = -.1332, LLCI: -.6584, ULCI: -.0063). Turning to he 
moderating role of experience in the relationship between regret and confidence, an interaction 
between regret and experience emerged (β = .02, t(486) = 1.95, p = .052) and the effect of 
confidence on Week 5 exercise minutes was significat (β = 15.68, t(487) = 2.34, p = .02). The 
pattern of conditional indirect effects matched the main analyses for outcome expectancy, with 
novices 1 SD below the mean of experience yielding a significant effect of regret on confidence 
and minutes exercised (β -1SD = -2.09, LLCI: -5.2132, ULCI: -.4801), as well as participants at 
the mean level of experience (β MEAN = -1.27, LLCI: -4.0746, ULCI: -.0634). This path was not 
significant for high-experience participants 1 SD above the mean (β +1SD = -.4597, LLCI:             
-3.7165, ULCI: 1.0589). However, the confidence interval for the index of moderated mediation 





conclusively determine that all levels of experienc on the indirect path are significantly different 
from each other. Thus, again we see similar results for the role of confidence as for outcome 
expectancy. In the serial model examining the role of action monitoring, regret, and confidence 
on Week 5 exercise minutes, the substantive effect of the indirect path matches across the two 
analyses. With regard to the moderating role of experience, the constituent path between regret 
and confidence is again altered by experience. However, because the confidence interval for the 
index of moderated mediation includes 0, we cannot definitively conclude that the conditional 
indirect effects for the path between regret, confidence, and minutes exercised are different from 
each other at all levels of the moderator. 
The results of these supplementary analyses indicate good support for the generality of 
the serial model linking planning to future outcomes. Analysis of the serial mediation model 
yields very similar patterns using a different dependent measure (future intentions) and a set of 
different mediators (predicted minutes exercised and confidence in place of outcome 
expectancy). The results showing the generality of how experience moderates the role of regret 
are somewhat more difficult to interpret.  While th variables examined in this supplementary 
analysis are similar to those under primary investigation, they also differ in potentially important 
ways (e.g., probabilistic v. deterministic judgments, more v. less feelings-based). We continue to 







PLANNING AND PREDICTION 
INTRODUCTION 
Many studies have demonstrated that implementation inte tions have a profound impact 
on goal achievement. In a variety of contexts ranging from consequential “real life” tasks like 
vaccination and cancer screening programs (Orbell, Hodgkins, and Sheeran 1997; Milkman et al. 
2011) to laboratory-based tasks like pushing a button quickly (e.g. Brandstätter, Lengfelder, and 
Gollwitzer 2001), a broad base of work has shown that setting plans helps people to be more 
likely to successfully attain their goals. 
Implementation intentions are postulated to work by forging connections between goal 
intentions, situational cues and desired behaviors. Gollwitzer (1999) reviews three mechanisms 
that contribute to the effectiveness of these plans. Fir t, implementation intentions make 
situational cues more salient, such that individuals are more likely to notice when they should act 
in service of the goal; second, they strengthen the cognitive association between goal-consistent 
situations and actions, and; third, implementation intentions eliminate the need to deliberate “in 
the moment” about what action should be undertaken. Together, these mechanisms contribute to 
a more automatic execution of behavior when the appropriate situation is encountered by the 
individual. 
For example, consider an aspiring exerciser who has decided to pursue an exercise goal 





way to work, she may say to herself, “I will stop in to the gym for a workout on my way home 
from work today at about 5:00.” When indeed she does drive by the gym on her evening 
commute, she should be more likely to say to herself, “Oh right, I was going to exercise this 
evening,” and to simply do so without needing to think “in the moment” about whether such an 
action is necessary or beneficial. 
Inherent in this mechanism is that plans should be most effective when people are good 
predictors. By their very nature, making plans induces people to look toward the future; they 
must anticipate circumstances when acting in servic of the goal would be beneficial, and decide 
how they will act when it is time to execute those actions. Because plans work by forming a 
bridge between situational cues and actions, they sould work best when people are able to 
accurately foresee the events that they will encounter, how they will act, and how they will feel. 
Returning to the exercise example, our exerciser’s plan is likely to be less effective if she does 
not anticipate that she will be taking a different route home that does not cause her to pass by the 
gym, or that the demands of her job are likely to require the need to stay late at the office.  
However, we know from prior research that people are often bad forecasters for both 
their future actions and for the outcomes that result from them. They tend to be overly optimistic, 
believing that they will act in ways consistent with their intentions and that negative results 
mainly happen to other people (Weinstein 1980; Armor and Taylor 1998; Koehler and Poon 
2006). They become blinded to risks that stand in their way once they start to pursue goals 
(Taylor and Gollwitzer 1995). They believe they will efficiently carry out tasks in support of 
their objectives, but are too optimistic about getting things done on time (Buehler et al. 1994), 
and they often are far off the mark when anticipating he strength and duration of their feelings 





Despite people’s poor track record at forecasting, plans often facilitate goal achievement. 
Do plans work in spite of our poor ability to make predictions about the future, or do plans also 
influence the forecasts that we make? It seems possible that, by guiding people to explicitly 
consider a broader range of possible circumstances that they will face during goal pursuit 
(specifically, obstacles), plans may influence the optimism of forecasts and help to improve their 
accuracy by providing a more complete picture of the road ahead. However, little work to date 
has examined the impact of planning on prediction. Alternately, plans may also focus people on 
a narrow slice of events that does not reflect reality or lead to negative outcomes like rumination, 
causing their forecasts to be less accurate and less optimistic.  
In this paper, we explore how the type of implementation intentions that people set 
influences the predictions that they make about their future goal pursuit. We examine forecasts 
formed after setting different types of plans which have been commonly been used in the 
literature – if-then and when-where-how plans. The for casts that we investigate are in three 
domains: the presence of future circumstances and actions (i.e. “What situations will happen as I 
am pursuing my goal and how will I act when I encounter them?”), the duration of time that a 
task will take, a forecast which is often referred to as the planning fallacy (i.e. “When will I 
achieve my goal?”), and future emotions relating to oal progress (i.e. “How will I feel as I am 
pursuing my goal?”).  
Examining these questions is important from both a t eoretical and practical standpoint. 
Little is currently known about the relationship betw en planning and forecasting, despite the 
fact that such knowledge would increase our understanding of the mechanisms behind why plans 
make it more or less likely that people achieve goals. For example, plans that accurately predict 





being successfully enacted. It is also possible that individuals who anticipate feeling very 
positive or negative during goal pursuit will be better prepared to grapple with emotions resulting 
from setbacks, resulting in a lower chance of disengaging from the goal. Finally, plans which 
help people to form more accurate time predictions may allow individuals to build in “slack” into 
their goal pursuits, such that deadlines, etc. are more easily accommodated.  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Obstacles? What obstacles? 
People very often make predictions about the future through rose-colored glasses. In 
contrast to their memories of the past, which are oft n tinted with a mix of positive and negative 
construals, people’s outlook on their future actions a d outcomes is very frequently positively 
biased (Armor and Taylor 1998; Ross and Newby-Clark 1998; Dunning 2007). People expect 
that they will do good things, and that as a result, good things are likely to happen to them. For 
instance, participants in Weinstein’s (1980) seminal study believed that they were far more likely 
than their peers to experience positive events like enjoying their job or owning their own home, 
and far less likely than their peers to fall prey to negative outcomes like developing a drinking 
problem or getting a divorce. Similarly, people also predict that they will be more likely to carry 
out desirable actions like donating blood (Koehler and Poon 2006), saving money (Koehler, 
White, and John 2011), and contributing to charity (Balcetis and Dunning 2008). Further, people 
also believe that they will act to reach goals in an efficient and timely manner – research on the 
planning fallacy demonstrates that individuals routinely underestimate the amount of time that it 
will take them to complete tasks. Perhaps the most famous (and expensive) manifestation of this 
rosy view is the construction of the Sydney Opera House, which was scheduled to open in 1963 





additional costs had been spent on construction (Buehler et al. 1994). Finally, people frequently 
exhibit biases in forecasting their future feelings, particularly in estimating the intensity and 
duration of how they will feel later on (for reviews, see Loewenstein and Schkade 1999; Wilson 
and Gilbert 2003). While these types of predictions are less uniformly rosy – for example, people 
have a strong tendency to neglect their ability to cope with future negative outcomes (Gilbert et 
al. 1998) – there is evidence that optimism pervades under certain conditions (e.g. Buehler and 
McFarland 2001; Liberman, Sagristano, and Trope 2002; Wilson and Gilbert 2003). 
A frequently proposed explanation for these biases i  that individuals rely on constructing 
plausible narrative scenarios in order to make forecasts. In other words, when asked to make a 
prediction, a common response is to engage in mental simulation and come up with a story for 
the chain of events that one expects will happen (Kahneman and Lovallo 1993; for a review, see 
Dunning 2007). So, for example, if a prospective exrciser is evaluating the amount of time he 
expects to visit the gym over the next month, he may picture himself conveniently stopping in 
for a workout on the way home from the office, the efficiency he will have as he progresses 
through his workout routine with purpose and vigor, and the energizing endorphins he will feel 
as the workout concludes. Such a process is often called an “inside approach,” in that it relies on 
the generation of a prediction based on features of the situation at hand. In contrast, individuals 
could also take into account an “outside approach” by incorporating other information external to 
the current problem like thinking back to past times when similar behavior has occurred, base 
rates for success, etc. (Kahneman and Lovallo 1993). Despite the fact that the past is often the 
best evidence for what will happen in the future, forecasters typically rely quite heavily on the 
narratives they construct using the inside approach (Ka neman and Lovallo 1993; Buehler et al. 





While the inside approach is an easily-accessible tool to reach for when faced with the 
need to make a forecast, its effective use is often difficult in practice. Foreseeing a complete and 
accurate view of the future is a colossal task, and as a result, the scenarios that people construct 
are typically incomplete (Kahneman and Lovallo 1993; Dunning 2007). Specifically, individuals 
tend to construct scenarios that are too simple, focusing on a single idealized chain of events 
where all events unfold as intended, and neglecting the possibility that something could go 
wrong (Buehler et al. 1994; Armor and Taylor 1998; Buehler and McFarland 2001; Dunning 
2007; Balcetis and Dunning 2008; Tanner and Carlson 2009; Koehler et al. 2011). For example, 
Buehler et al (1994) asked participants to predict when they would achieve a goal to finish an 
upcoming academic assignment and to think aloud while doing so. Over 70% of the thoughts 
generated were about future facilitative actions in ervice of the goal, and only 3% dealt with 
future problems that might arise. Weinstein (1980) similarly found that participants were able to 
generate many more reasons why they would reach positive outcomes (versus fall short of good 
outcomes) and many more reasons why they would avoid negative scenarios (versus fall prey to 
them).  
Thus, when they look toward the future and simulate what will happen, people often do 
so by imagining the path from start to finish will be straightforward and unencumbered. 
However, while people are optimistic, their forecasts remain grounded in reality and are open to 
malleability – Armor and Taylor (1998) describe a “situated optimist” who bases his 
expectations for the future on scenarios that seem to parsimoniously describe what might happen 
with events that are compelling and easy to imagine, but that remain grounded in some 
understanding of reality. The problem is that peopl rarely plan to fail, so hindrances and 





Taylor 1998; Dunning 2007). Indeed, interventions that help break people away from their 
disproportionate focus on a straightforward future – for example, asking them to make forecasts 
for other people, encouraging the consideration of “w rst-case scenarios,” contrasting 
predictions against what would happen in an “ideal world,” changing the time frame at hand, or 
prompting forecasters to “unpack” tasks into multiple component parts – are often successful at 
inducing less optimistic forecasts (Newby-Clark et al. 2000; Buehler and McFarland 2001; 
Kruger and Evans 2004; Dunning 2007; Balcetis and Dunning 2008; Tanner and Carlson 2009; 
Peetz, Buehler, and Wilson 2010). 
Plans and forecasting 
As such, a contributing driver behind optimistic forecasts seems to be that people think 
too narrowly about the relatively small range of step  they expect to take in order to successfully 
achieve a goal, and not enough about what to do in case of alternate scenarios like problems that 
could stand in their way. Thus, might different types of plans that change the likelihood of 
considering obstacles also affect the forecasts tha people make? 
Above, we have described how people set forecasts by building simulations or narratives 
for how they expect the future to unfold. Research demonstrates that planning is also connected 
to the process of scenario-building. For example, Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth (1979) argue that 
mental simulations provide the basis to identify the actions that need to be carried out and the 
constraints faced in the execution of the goal, and they thus serve as an input to form and revise 
comprehensive plans. Indeed, when people envision the actions or the process that they will need 
to take in order to reach a goal, it enhances the likelihood that they engage in planning, resulting 
in better performance. The benefits of this simulation seem to accrue from thinking about 





et al. 1998; Pham and Taylor 1999). Recently, Masicampo et al. (2015) proposed that mental 
simulation underlies the effectiveness of implementation intentions, demonstrating that both 
plans and simulations help people to achieve goals but that the combination of the two strategies 
did not yield additional benefits beyond using one alone. Further, when participants’ ability to 
accurately simulate the task was impeded, the helpful effect of plans was eliminated. Finally, 
additional evidence linking scenario-building and planning comes from the literature on mental 
contrasting (for reviews, see Oettingen 2012; Oettingen, Wittchen, and Gollwitzer 2013). This 
strategy induces participants to compare the reality of heir current situation with their desired 
outcome, which prompts both increased motivation and the identification of the means required 
to bridge the gap between the present reality and the wanted end-state. Specifically, when 
expectations for success are high, mental contrasting helps individuals to recognize elements of 
their current situation that hinder goal pursuit as ob tacles and highlights that action is necessary 
to overcome them. Recent work (e.g. Adriaanse et al. 2010; Oettingen et al. 2015) has shown 
that combining planning and mental contrasting results in improved efficacy compared to using 
either strategy on its own (particularly when it is d fficult for planners to anticipate the future), 
revealing the synergy of the two processes. Thus, te e findings in combination suggest a strong 
association between planning and developing a simulation or narrative of the future.  
We build upon this body of work by asking a related but distinct question. Rather than 
evaluating whether the effect of future action is enhanced or diminished by the planning and/or 
simulation, we posit that the act of setting different types of plans changes the narratives that 
people construct. In the previous chapter, we described two types of plans that have been 
commonly and mainly interchangeably used in the imple entation intentions literature – if-then 





they guide the planner to start with a situation that ey might encounter, and then to specify an 
action to take in response. In contrast, we maintain that when-where-how plans are more 
proactive. Rather than waiting for a situation to occur, they start with a desired action and then 
direct the participant to specify supporting details of when, where, how, and for how long that 
action will be carried out. 
Importantly, in Study 1 of the previous chapter, we demonstrated that these differences in 
format led to differences in the type of plan that is formed. Building upon the work of Sniehotta 
and his colleagues (e.g. Sniehotta et al. 2005), we distinguished between plans intended to 
specify facilitative steps to reach the goal and plans that outline means to cope with obstacles. 
Specifically, we found that participants who formed if-then plans were more likely to bring to 
mind obstacles that required a coping response (what e called “coping plans”), while when-
where-how planners were more likely to think about facilitative steps to reach the conclusion of 
the goal (what we called “step plans”).9 Returning to the exercise example, an if-then planner 
might be more likely to think, “If the weather is bad when it’s time to go for a run then I will go 
to the gym instead,” while a when-where-how planner might lay out a plan like, “I will go to the 
gym this evening by driving there on my way home from work. It should take me about 40 
minutes.” Thus, it seems possible that the type of plan that an individual forms may influence 
forecasts by guiding the degree to which facilitative steps or means to cope with obstacles are 
included in the narrative used to construct the forcast.  
Hypotheses 
                                                 
 
9 Note that by using the term “steps” we intend to distinguish actions which facilitate progress toward the goal rather 






In sum, people make forecasts about what will happen during goal pursuit, how they will 
feel as the goal is underway, and when it will reach  successful conclusion by constructing 
mental simulations of what they expect will happen. Most frequently, those simulations consist 
of a compelling narrative that is focused almost exclusively on how to proceed toward the goal, 
and very rarely on problems that might stand in the way. Because plans change the nature of the 
situations and actions that people consider when thy pursue the goal they are also likely to 
change their forecasts. This leads to two sets of competing general predictions: 
On the one hand, by highlighting obstacles that people would otherwise not consider, if-
then plans may to lead to more comprehensive narratives – people will be more likely to predict 
what will actually happen in the future – and in turn they will generate less optimistic and more 
accurate forecasts. Conversely, when-where-how plans, which increase the salience of 
facilitative steps, should strengthen people’s natural tendencies to only focus on what they will 
do to succeed at the goal, leading to more extreme predictions and less accurate forecasts. 
On the other hand, two alternate possibilities alsoexist, depending on the type of forecast 
at hand. First, when they are asked to predict the events that will unfold in the future, if-then 
planners who are focused on obstacles may in fact be less accurate. Because coping with 
obstacles requires a reaction to some barrier (be it either an internal barrier like motivation or an 
external stimulus like the weather), the likelihood of needing to carry out the plan is probabilistic 
– if the obstacle never occurs, there is no need to cope by carrying out the plan. In contrast, plans 
which lay out facilitative steps for how to progress toward the goal are often under greater 
volitional control. As an example, consider an exerciser who makes a plan for how to exercise 
even when the weather is inclement and another fitness buff who plans to go to the gym every 





with rainy skies and driving winds will never have the opportunity to execute his or her plan. 
However, 5:00 pm will always arrive every day, so the opportunity to carry out the step of going 
to the gym at that time will always be available. Thus, individuals who set if-then plans focused 
on obstacles may in fact generate less accurate forecasts. This scenario seems particularly likely 
for planners who do not have much experience with the goal at hand – accurately forecasting 
problems which may arise is often challenging for individuals pursuing new and uncertain goals 
(Sniehotta et al. 2005). Second, when they are asked to predict the amount of time that a task will 
take or how they will feel in the future, if-then planners may also be more optimistic if their 
plans for how to cope with problems generate a feeling of confidence or greater certainty – 
thoughts like, “Well now I know what to expect and how to deal with these challenges,” for 
example. 
In this paper, we examine forecasts in three different ways. First, we directly ask whether 
people who form certain types of plans are better or worse at anticipating the events that will 
arise during goal pursuit and how they will act during those opportunities. In other words, did the 
plan that an individual formed accurately reflect the realities of what occurred as they were 
pursuing their goal and did the individual carry out the action that was planned? Was their 
narrative indeed comprehensive?  Second, we explore the influence of plan format on the task 
time predictions (i.e. the planning fallacy). Finally, we examine whether plan format influences 








STUDY 1: PREDICTIONS FOR FUTURE EVENTS 
In order to make plans, people must form predictions f what they think will happen in 
the future; they must evaluate which goal-consistent opportunities that they expect to arise and 
work out an action that seems feasible to carry out in such a scenario. In this study, we sought to 
examine the degree to which different types of plans reflect the reality of goal pursuit – in other 
words, do the scenarios that people plan to encounter as they pursue their goal actually arise, and 
do they carry out the actions that they have planned to execute? As we have argued above, 
planning and forecasting are closely linked. Thus, while we did not explicitly direct participants 
to make forecasts, the opportunities and actions they t at consider as part of the process of 
planning should represent the ways in which they expect the future to unfold while pursuing the 
goal. 
Plan type could affect the accuracy of plans in multiple ways, leading to a set of 
competing hypotheses. As described above, setting if-then plans, which focus individuals more 
intently upon how to cope with obstacles, may lead p rticipants to think about problems that 
would have otherwise gone unconsidered, increasing the likelihood that their plans will reflect 
actual events. In contrast, if their plans are somewhat inflexible and focused on a narrow set of 
events that never occurs, if-then planners could be more likely to form plans that are a relatively 
inaccurate depiction of future goal pursuit, leading to time and effort spent preparing for events 
that never materialize.  
Further, we expected that the task of figuring out which opportunities and actions will 
occur in the future would be easier for some participants than others. Specifically, it is easier to 
know what to expect of the future if one has learned from experiencing similar situations and 





to anticipate obstacles (Sniehotta et al. 2005). Thus, we expected that greater experience would 
reduce differences in accuracy between if-then and when-where-how planners. 
Participants and Method 
Participants were drawn from “Exercise!” (“E!”; the name of this program is disguised 
for confidentiality), a physical fitness program at a large U.S. university. Participants tracked the 
number of minutes that they engage in physical exercis  over a 6-week period and entered their 
results into a tracking website. To this program, we added an experiment where participants 
completed one of three planning interventions (or we e assigned to a no-plan control condition). 
All participants were invited to participate in the study via an email invitation. To maintain 
consistency with the sample for our hypotheses examined in Chapter 1, Study 3, we used the 
same participant inclusion criteria as described thre. However, because control participants 
were not asked to form plans, they were not included in the analysis for this study, leaving 367 
participants remaining. 
In Week 2 of the E! program, participants were randomly assigned to one of four 
conditions. In the control condition, participants did not receive any guidance from us on 
forming plans and carried out their exercise routine naturalistically. In the if-then condition, 
participants first saw instructions and an example of two if-then plans for an unrelated healthy 
eating goal and they then outlined one to four obstacles that could arise as they were working 
toward their E! exercise goal. Participants then completed each plan by specifying a matching 
action that they would take to cope with the obstacle. In the when-where-how condition, 
participants saw instructions and a corresponding healt y eating example in that format and then 
laid out one to four actions that they could take to pursue their E! exercise goal. They then 





each step. We also administered a third experimental condition – hybrid plans – as an 
exploratory investigation to create a new planning format to encourage participants to think 
about both how to proceed toward the goal and how to cope with obstacles, as well as to 
encourage interdependent consideration of the elements of the plan. Because this format was 
exploratory, we did not have a priori predictions for how it would affect prediction, so we will 
not further discuss this condition for the rest of his paper. During Week 4 of the study, 
participants received a follow-up questionnaire including the dependent measure at hand. 
Participants were reminded of their plans and for each they were asked to indicate whether over 
the course of the past week (a) they had the opportunity to carry out this part of their plan, and 
(b) whether they actually did so. Participants indicated their answer to each question by clicking 
check boxes next to each plan statement. Thus, we can determine the accuracy of participants’ 
predictions for the scenarios that will arise during goal pursuit and for execution of their intended 
response. As a measure of experience, participants also indicated the number of times they have 
participated in the E! program. 
Results 
 Upon initial examination of the data, we noted that some participants had indicated that 
they had carried out an element of their plan while leaving the box unchecked indicating they 
had the opportunity to do so. Of course, in order to act, one must have also had the opportunity to 
do so. Thus, we recoded the opportunity measure to indicate that the opportunity to act was 
present if the plan was executed. We then counted th  number of plans generated by each 
participant and adjusted counts to reflect duplicates or invalid responses. Finally, for each 
participant we calculated the proportion of plans where the participant indicated (a) the planned 





proportion bounded by 0 and 1, prior to analysis, proportions were transformed using an arcsine-
root transformation as outlined by Sokal and Rohlf (1995).12 For interpretability, the means 
presented below are untransformed, while statistical tests incorporate the transformed dependent 
variable. To account for heterogeneity in participants’ commitment to the E! program and to 
exercising, we controlled for goal intentions using the measures described in Chapter 1, Study 3.   
 Overall, step plans made by participants in the whn-where-how condition were a better 
reflection of the actual events that occurred during goal pursuit than the coping plans made by 
participants in the if-then condition. When-where-how planners had the opportunity to carry out 
92% of their plans (SD = .19) while if-then planners reported that they had the chance to carry 
out 88% of theirs (SD = .25). However, a regression indicated that this difference did not reach 
significance (βOPPORTUNITY = -.04, t(363) = -1.62,  p = .11). When-where-how planners were also 
more likely to execute their intended actions, repoting that they carried out their plans 69% of 
the time (SD = .35). If-then planners were less successful, carrying out 62% of their plans (SD = 
.32). This difference also approached but did not reach significance βACTION = -.05, t(363) =         
-1.63, p = .10). 
Thus, returning to our competing hypotheses, these initial results are suggestive but not 
significantly supportive of our second prediction. It seems that the probabilistic nature of the 
obstacle-focused coping plans formed by participants in he if-then condition led them to form 
plans that were less likely to reflect what actually happened during goal pursuit. Conversely, 
when-where-how planners, who formed plans about steps to get from the start of the goal to the 
                                                 
 
12 We also examined results using a log-transformed DV and a generalized linear model with a logit link function 
and binomial variance function (including robust standard errors), as recommended by the UCLA Statistical 
Consulting Group (n.d.). All methods of analysis yielded similar substantive conclusions; for brevity we present 





finish, were more likely to have had the chance to put their plans into action, and were more 
likely have to actually done so.  
  However, recall that experience should also play a role in the ability to accurately predict 
what will happen during goal pursuit. When the goal is new, figuring out what events are likely 
to happen is a tough prospect, but with experience, i dividuals should have a better 
understanding of the scenarios they are likely to encounter and the likelihood that their plans can 
be successfully executed, particularly for how to cope with obstacles (Sniehotta et al. 2005). We 
predicted that relative novices would show the greatest gap in predictive accuracy, while the 
benefit of experience would even out differences betwe n forming coping-focused if-then plans 
and step-focused when-where-how plans. To test this pro pect, we conducted a moderation 
analysis with the number of prior times respondents had previously participated in the E! 
program entered in the model as a moderator. Participants reported having previously 
participated in E! between 0 and more than 10 times.  
First, experience moderated the likelihood of selecting plans where the opportunity to act 
arose during goal pursuit. The interaction between xperience and planning condition was 
significant (β = .02, t(360) = 2.18, p = .03). If-then planners 1 SD below the mean for experience 
were significantly less likely to generate plans that they eventually had the chance to enact, 
compared to when-where-how planners (β -1SD = -.08, t(360) = -2.68, p = .01), while participants 
at the mean level of experience displayed the same patt rn with marginal significance (β MEAN =  
-.04, t(360) = -1.67, p = .096). No significant difference between planning modes emerged for 





Second, the same pattern of results arose when consideri g the proportion of plans that 
participants actually carried out. Again, the interaction between experience and planning 
condition was significant (β = .03, t(360) = 3.25, p = .001). If-then planners 1 SD below the 
mean experience level were significantly worse at en cting their plans versus when-where-how 
planners (β -1SD = -.15, t(360) = -3.47, p = .001), while participants at the mean level of 
experience displayed the same pattern at a marginal level of significance (βMEAN = -.05, t(360) = 
-1.74, p = .08). No significant difference between plan types emerged for participants at 1 SD 
above the mean level of experience (β + 1SD = .05, t(360) = 1.07, p = .29). 
Discussion 
 In this study we examined the accuracy of participants’ forecasts for planned future 
events and actions. In other words, did participants c ually encounter the events that they laid 
out in their plans, and when given the opportunity to act, did they actually do what they thought 
they would do? 
 Our a priori predictions for this question were mixed. On one hand, if-then plans focused 
on how to cope with obstacles could help broaden th scope of participants’ narratives for how 
goal pursuit would unfold, prompting them to consider scenarios and actions that would have 
otherwise gone unnoticed. On the other hand, the presence of obstacles is more probabilistic than 
steps to get from point A to point B; in a volatile environment, individuals likely have less 
control over whether they will need to put their plan to use because the obstacle they have in 
mind may or may not materialize and over whether thir planned actions are indeed appropriate 





 These results suggest that our latter prediction rings more true. Compared to step-focused 
when-where-how plans, thinking about how to cope with barriers in the if-then condition led to 
fewer opportunities to carry out one’s plan and a reduced likelihood of actually following 
through on one’s intended action. Interestingly, experience mattered for the accuracy of 
participants’ predictions for what was to come during goal pursuit – novice if-then planners 
displayed a tendency to be worse at predicting the problems that would come their way and how 
they would cope with them, but this difference dissipated for more experienced participants who 
should find it easier to understand the challenges that will arise in the future.  
 While these results are encouraging, they are a first step in this line of examination. To 
fully answer the question of whether plans encouraged participants to consider scenarios and 
actions that would have otherwise gone unnoticed, it would be helpful to also measure the extent 
to which participants encountered situations or undertook actions that occurred outside the 
bounds of their plans or the extent to which they wre surprised about their opportunities/actions 
that occurred during goal pursuit. Participants may well have also made other plans that went 
beyond the prompts that we gave them in each conditi  (for example, maybe if-then planners 
also utilized elements of when-where-how plans, or vice-versa). If this is the case, the scope of 
plans we observed is incomplete, and participants may have actually been more or less accurate 
on their full range of plans than these data indicate. It would also be informative to measure 
habit, as a related but different explanation for the finding that more experienced participants are 
better at looking ahead to predict future events is hat people who are experienced can form plans 
by considering pre-existing habits that novices do not possess. In future work, we aim to widen 






STUDY 2: TIME PREDICTIONS 
 In this study, we examined prediction in a different light; we sought to examine how 
plans change the accuracy of forecasts for the duration of future tasks. 
In general, people tend to be rather inaccurate at answering the question, “How long will 
this task take me to complete?” Specifically, they typically exhibit an optimistic bias, predicting 
that they will finish their undertaking earlier than the actual time of completion. This 
phenomenon is commonly referred to in the literature as the “planning fallacy” (Buehler et al. 
1994, 2010). 
A commonly-advanced cognitive explanation for the planning fallacy is that people rely 
too heavily upon an “inside perspective” when formulating their forecasts for the duration of the 
task – they lay out a scenario under which they expect goal pursuit to unfold under ideal 
conditions, and they fail to consider other possibilities that might occur, such as obstacles or 
problems that would become apparent by taking into account information like past experiences 
or base rates of success (Kahneman and Lovallo 1993; Buehler, Griffin, and Ross 2002). Indeed, 
measures designed to shift participants’ narrative away from a seemingly straightforward and 
linear simulation of the task, such as soliciting predictions for others’ goal pursuit (Buehler et al. 
1994), prompting respondents to “unpack” the task into ts constituent parts (Kruger and Evans 
2004), and generating “worst-case scenarios” (Newby-Clark et al. 2000) tend to lead to less 
optimistic and more accurate forecasts. 
Engaging in planning has also been shown to change the degree to which individuals fall 
prey to the planning fallacy. Specifically, planning seems to impact the prediction side of the 
accuracy equation – individuals change their expectations about how long the task will take, but 





asking participants to think about “when, where, and how” (in other words, a step plan) they 
would carry out their Christmas shopping exacerbated th  planning fallacy by making forecasts 
more optimistic while leaving the actual finish dates untouched. Buehler and Griffin attribute this 
increase in optimism to a shift toward “future focus” – that plans facilitate an even greater 
reliance on the “inside perspective,” causing participants to become too intently focused on a 
seemingly compelling narrative that results from creating the plan. Conversely, other research 
demonstrates that thinking about obstacles seems to reduce the optimism in prediction. When 
individuals are asked to “unpack” a task into each nd every one of its component actions (e.g. 
“getting ready for a date” involves picking out a shirt, picking out a pair of pants, putting on the 
clothes, brushing your teeth, brushing your hair, etc.; it seems plausible to think of a huge 
“laundry list” of tasks like this as an obstacle, in contrast to an easily digestible narrative as in 
Buehler & Griffin’s task), participants made less optimistic forecasts, ameliorating the planning 
fallacy. Again, these changes in accuracy were driven by changes in participants’ forecasts 
(Kruger and Evans 2004). Finally, perhaps the most direct evidence for the impact of thinking 
about steps and obstacles on task time prediction comes from Peetz, Buehler and Wilson (2010), 
who demonstrated that task prediction times are influe ced by contextual factors (they examined 
temporal distance) which guide participants to be more cognizant of plans or the presence of 
obstacles.13 Peetz et al. find that when participants are guided to think about plans (either by 
                                                 
 
13 One critical difference between our studies and the work by Peetz, Buehler, and Wilson is that in their studies, 
obstacle focus was either manipulated through temporal distance or by directing participants explicitly to think about 
“possible interruptions” or “a step-by-step plan” / “step-by-step components”) Peetz et al. did not examine the 
impact of plan format, nor the impact of plans that detail means to cope with obstacles (rather, Peetz et al. had 
participants think about the presence of potential barriers, not how to deal with them). This distincton is potentially 
important, as plans that focus participants on how to cope with obstacles may contribute to a narrative that the 
obstacles are easy to overcome, making predictions more optimistic. The existing data by Peetz et al. do not address 
this issue. The current investigation also allows us to further disentangle the effect of temporal distance from 





invoking greater temporal distance or in one experim nt, via a direct induction), doing so leads 
to more optimistic predictions, compared to when individuals think about the presence of 
obstacles. Changes in these predictions were mediated by thought content.  
We build upon this work by examining the impact of dif erent types of plans. Neither 
Buehler and Griffin nor Peetz et al. examine how predictions may change depending on the type 
of plan that individuals set – either plans which increase the likelihood that individuals will 
consider how to enact steps, or plans that make it more likely people will think about how to 
overcome obstacles. Because past work has shown that plans seem to affect bias in the planning 
fallacy through changes in prediction (and not changes in actual action), we focus on how plans 
are likely to change forecasts and affect forecast error in turn. As in Study 1, two sets of 
predictions are possible because of the uncertain role that if-then plans will play.   
Existing data from both Buehler and Griffin and Peetz et al. suggest that when-where-
how plans should lead to optimistic predictions, as they should focus individuals on an idealized 
narrative where goal pursuit seems straightforward an  subject to little interference from 
barriers. Following this work, these optimistic forecasts should lead to a greater susceptibility to 
the planning fallacy – participants’ predictions for when they will finish the task will be less 
accurate.  
Conversely, if-then plans should stimulate thoughts about coping with obstacles, but the 
effect of this shift is unclear. Our primary hypothesis is that this focus on overcoming barriers 
will prompt if-then planners to be less optimistic in their forecasts (and thus more accurate) as 
they recognize that the task which they are asked to consider – shopping for the holidays –  may 





This shift in thought could lead if-then planners to be less optimistic or even pessimistic in their 
forecasts. However, the coping plans created by participants in the if-then condition may also 
give rise to thoughts like, “OK, I know what to expect and how to deal with it – I have this under 
control.” Such a pattern may also lead to optimism in prediction, suggesting that setting any plan 
will exacerbate the planning fallacy by shifting the focus of planners toward narratives where 
goal pursuit seems routine, idealized, and smooth, akin to the “future focus” account made by 
Buehler and Griffin.  
To tease apart these scenarios, we also included two control conditions. Participants in 
the no-plan control condition were not directed to set any plan at all as a naturalistic baseline, 
while participants assigned to a free-plan control condition set their own plans without any 
guidance on format. If setting any plan is sufficient to lead participants toward optimistic 
predictions, we should see obstacle-focused if-then pla ners, step-focused when-where-how 
planners, and participants in the free-plan control condition all look the same – more optimistic 
(and thus less accurate). However, if plan type matters, we should see differences emerge 
between these conditions. 
In this study we selected a commonly-enacted goal – shopping for the holidays – because 
it entails the need to consider both facilitative st p  (e.g. figuring out what gifts that recipients 
would want, traveling to the store or going online to buy those gifts, etc.) and obstacles that 
might stand in the way (e.g. out-of-stock items, crowds, people who are difficult to buy for, etc.). 
This goal is also reasonably complex, necessitating that participants think of a number of 
situations and actions in order to complete it. Finally, this goal has been used in past studies of 
the planning fallacy (Buehler and Griffin 2003) and we adapted our materials from their 





Participants and Method 
Participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk, an online crowdsourcing 
platform commonly used for behavioral experiments (Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010). 
The study took place at the beginning of December, 2013, at the start of the Christmas shopping 
season, and was completed in two waves. In Wave 1, participants were asked to form plans to 
complete their Christmas shopping and to make a prediction about when that shopping would be 
completed. In Wave 2, participants were recontacted and they reported the actual date that they 
finished buying their gifts. Our posting specifically recruited participants in the United States 
who had remaining Christmas shopping to complete for at least three gift recipients. Geolocation 
identified 11 participants who completed the survey from outside the United States, so these 
participants were excluded from the dataset, as shopping procedures and traditions are likely to 
differ in other cultures. Two participants indicated that they had already completed all their 
shopping for their intended recipients, so they were also excluded from the dataset, as were three 
participants whose predicted or actual shopping completion dates were before they started the 
survey, and three participants who generated no plans conforming to the directions. Examination 
of the critical dependent measures – participants’ predictions for when they would finish their 
shopping, their actual finish times, and prediction error – revealed the presence of outliers such 
as predictions of finishing Christmas shopping in late January. To reduce the impact of these 
outliers but retain participants in the dataset, we Winsorized these variables (Tukey 1962; Chen 
and Dixon 1972) to set values greater than the 99th percentile and less than the 1st percentile at 






TABLE 2.1. The following analyses use the Winsorized measures. Finally, to allow for a 
consistent set of participants over time, we restricted our analysis sample to participants who 
completed both Wave 1 and Wave 2. After the exclusions discussed above, 311 shoppers 
completed Wave 1 and 201 participants completed Wave 2. 
At the beginning of Wave 1, participants named three p ople for whom they still had 
remaining shopping to finish and indicated how much of their shopping they had already 
completed. They were asked to think of buying presents for those three target recipients as their 
goal for the study. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of five conditions for the 
planning intervention.  
In the directions for all conditions except the hybrid condition described below, 
participants were not directed to consider steps or obstacles but rather we intended the planning 
interventions themselves to naturally shape the nature of the plans that were formed. To avoid 
guiding participants as to the content of the means they selected for their plans, all examples that 
we provided featured both a step-focused and an obstacle-focused plan, and the order of these 
was counterbalanced. In the if-then condition, participants formed four if-then plans using the 
prompts shown in APPENDIX 2.1. In the when-where-how c ndition, participants completed 
four when-where-how plans. In the free-plan control condition, participants simply saw a text 
box and were asked to “make a plan for how you will act.” In the no-plan control condition, 
participants did not see any discussion or intervention about planning. Finally, we collected a 
hybrid condition as an exploratory attempt to create an optimal planning intervention based on 
the project management literature for managing undertakings like construction and engineering 
works (Project Management Institute 2008). Our objectiv s for this condition were to encourage 





interdependent manner. Note that in this condition, participants were directed to consider steps 
and obstacles, unlike in the other conditions we have previously described where the directions 
were neutral to plan content. Participants first generated two broad categories of actions (e.g., 
“Figuring out what my gift recipients would like,” or “Staying within my budget”) and then 
elaborated upon those categories by specifying one to two specific actions for each along with 
who, how, when/how long, and where those actions would be executed. Participants then laid out 
two obstacles in an if-then format. Finally, they arranged all of the actions in the expected order 
of execution. Because this type of plan encourages thoughts about both steps and obstacles, we 
did not have a priori predictions for how it would affect participants’ predictions. Thus, we do 
not discuss it further. Following the planning interv ntions, participants created a prediction 
(including the date and time) for when they expected to finish their shopping for the three people 
on their list, and they described their thoughts for h w that prediction was generated. We also 
collected measures about participants’ intentions t complete their shopping and their 
expectation that their prediction would be realized, along with demographic items. In Wave 2, 
participants were reminded of the three people who they specified on their shopping list and then 
were asked to indicate the date and time when they finished shopping for those individuals. We 
then administered measures adapted from Sniehotta et al. (2005) about the degree to which 
participants formed plans. Finally, respondents completed individual difference scales about their 
likelihood to elaborate upon potential outcomes (Nenkov et al. 2008) and the propensity to plan 
(Lynch Jr. et al. 2010). 
In the analyses that follow, we focus upon three pieces of information. First, since 
participants were not directed by us to consider stps or obstacles we evaluated whether indeed 





type of plan led to changes in forecasts and in tur, accuracy for when the shopping task would 
be completed. Finally, we evaluated whether or not a y changes in forecasts were driven by plan 
content. 
Results 
Does plan type influence plan content? First, because participants were not directed by us 
to think about either steps or obstacles, we sought to determine whether the type of plan that 
participants formed guided the situations and actions they considered. We predicted that forming 
if-then plans would increase the likelihood that participants would consider means to cope with 
obstacles, while forming when-where-how plans would make steps more prominent. Two raters 
blind to hypothesis independently coded each plan st tement to evaluate whether it referred to a 
facilitative step or to an obstacle and reached consensus on as many non-matching items as 
possible. Interrater reliability was good (intraclass correlation for proportions = .88). No-plan 
control participants (n = 43) did not form known plans, so they are not included in these 
analyses. As expected, the type of plan that participants formed influenced the situations and 
actions they considered. We examined these plans in two ways. First, we calculated the 
proportion of each participant’s plan statements that were focused on obstacle coping and 
transformed these proportions using an arcsine-root t ansformation as outlined by Sokal and 
Rohlf (1995) and then used this as the dependent measur  in an ANOVA with planned 
comparisons. Untransformed means are reported for interpretability. Consistent with past 
research, forming a when-where-how plan caused participants to devote nearly all of their 
attention to facilitative actions, and almost none to how to deal with obstacles (MWWH = .05, SD 





how to cope with obstacles (MIT = .57, SD = .36), a difference that was statistically significant 
(F(1, 113) = 100.87, p = < .001).  
Second, direct comparison of the proportion of obstacle statements in the free-plan 
control condition was not possible, since free-plan p rticipants each only formed one statement. 
Thus, we also compared the first statement that participants made in the if-then and when-where 
how conditions – which should reflect the type of action that was most pressingly on 
participants’ minds – with the unguided plans in the free-plan condition. When participants were 
given no guidance on how to form a plan, they focused mainly on steps but did devote some 
attention to strategies to cope with barriers (MFREE-PLAN = .26, SD = .45). Setting an if-then plan 
increased the likelihood of considering obstacles (M IT = .67, SD = .48) while setting a when-
where-how plan focused the attention exclusively on steps (MIT = .00, SD = .00). Z-tests for 
proportions at the .05 significance level confirmed that each of these proportions differed from 
each other.  
Thus, as in the first study of Chapter 1, the format of plans changed the situations and 
actions that individuals focus upon when considering how to pursue the goal. When they were 
left to their own devices to make a plan, these participants thought mostly about how to enact 
steps to reach the goal but also devoted some thought to how to cope with problems. When-
where-how plans intensified the focus on steps, while if-then plans cast a greater light on means 
to cope with obstacles.14  
                                                 
 
14 Interestingly, one may note that participants in the free plan condition were more likely to focus on obstacles in 
this task versus in the first study of Chapter 1, which contained a similar intervention and was also b ut completing 
holiday shopping. This difference may relate to characteristics of the sample. Participants in the current study were 
mainly non-student community members from Mechanical Turk, while participants in Chapter 1, Study 1 were 
undergraduate students at a large U.S. university. Our Mechanical Turk sample also contained some students and 
they formed plans containing fewer obstacles than non-students. When the entire sample who formed plans is 
considered (not just those participants who also completed Wave 2), a t-test using the arcsine-root transformed 





Does plan type influence prediction optimism and accuracy? Next, we generated 
participants’ predicted and actual shopping completion times and dates to numerical values by 
converting the time to a fraction of the day and ading it to the date value (e.g. a participant 
predicting that they would finish shopping on Decemb r 18 at 12:00 pm received a score of 
18.50, a participant actually finishing on December 20 at 6:00 pm received a score of 20.75). We 
then calculated prediction error by subtracting the actual date from the forecast (the participant in 
the example above would have an error score of -2.25; in other words, his forecasted completion 
date was 2.25 days early compared to reality).  
Overall, plan type significantly affected the accuracy of participants’ predictions about 
when they would complete their Christmas shopping. I  all conditions, participants generated 
forecasts that were too optimistic – they predicted that they would finish their shopping earlier 
than they actually did. However, the type of plan that participants formed changed the degree of 
their bias. Consistent with prior work (Buehler et al. 1994; Buehler and Griffin 2003), the 
underlying reason driving the planning fallacy was not because the plans changed participants’ 
actual behavior – in other words, when they actually finished their Christmas shopping – but 
rather, the plans changed shoppers’ initial forecasts bout when they would wrap up the task. 
First, using an ANOVA with planned contrasts, we compared the two control conditions 
to evaluate whether the act of setting any plan influences the planning fallacy in and of itself 
because it shifts one’s focus to the future, or whether the type of plan yields changes in their 
forecast optimism and accuracy. As a reminder, participants set no plans in the no-plan control 
condition, and set unguided plans with no specified format in the free plan condition. No-plan 
                                                 
 
sample of participants who completed both Waves 1 and 2, this difference was in the same direction but failed to 
reach significance. While not conclusive, these trends provide some insight that participants in this population seem 





control participants predicted that they would finish their shopping approximately three days 
before they actually did so (MNO-PLAN = -3.05, SD = 4.50). Free-plan participants were slightly 
more optimistic (MFREE-PLAN = -3.41, SD = 4.34), but this difference between co trol conditions 
was not significant (F(1, 196) = .11, p = .74). Breaking down accuracy into its two components, 
neither forecasts (MNO-PLAN = 18.76, SDNO-PLAN = 4.31 v. MFREE-PLAN = 18.09, SDFREE-PLAN = 
3.72; F(1,196) = .55, p = .46) nor actual completion times (MNO-PLAN = 21.82, SDNO-PLAN = 2.58 
v. MFREE-PLAN = 21.53, SDFREE-PLAN = 2.92; F(1,196) = .12, p = .73) differed across control 
conditions. Thus, the act of simply setting any plan does not appear to influence forecast 
accuracy. Rather, the type of plan shapes participants’ judgments and in turnhe degree to which 
they exhibit the planning fallacy. 
Second, we examined how plan format influenced participants’ accuracy in estimating 
task duration. Because forecast accuracy in the two control conditions did not differ 
significantly, in subsequent analyses we analyzed th m jointly in comparison to the if-then and 
when-where-how conditions using planned contrasts. Replicating Buehler and Griffin’s (2003) 
finding, participants who set when-where-how plans displayed a greater optimistic bias than 
participants in the two control conditions, predicting that they would finish their Christmas 
shopping nearly five and a half days before actually doing so (MWWH = -5.43, SDWWH = 5.33; 
F(1,196) = 5.11, p = .03). Conversely, setting an if-then plan led to a reduction in the planning 
fallacy – if-then planners predicted that they would complete their shopping about two and a half 
days prior to reality (MIT = -2.46, SDIT = 3.71). This reduction was significant compared to 
WWH planners (F(1,196) = 6.72, p = .01). However, contrary to our expectations, if-then 
planners’ accuracy did not differ from control (F(1,196) = .64, p = .43). Turning to forecasts, 





with the two control conditions falling in between (FWWH-CONTROL (1,196) = 2.65, p = .105; FIT-
CONTROL (1,196) = 3.11, p = .08). In contrast, actual completion times were invariant across 
conditions (FWWH-CONTROL (1,196) = 1.15, p = .29; FIT-CONTROL (1,196) = .82, p = .37; FWWH-IT 
(1,196) = .02, p = .88). 
Thus, extending Buehler & Griffin’s (2003) “future focus” argument, setting plans does 
change the nature of bias in the planning fallacy. However, the effect is more nuanced than 
simply shining a more intense spotlight on the future. Simply setting a plan is not sufficient to 
change the accuracy of participants’ forecasts or thei optimism, as shown by the lack of a 
difference between the no-plan control and the free-plan control condition, where participants 
created plans in an unguided manner.  
However, when the nature of the plan directs the spotlight of participants’ attention in 
certain directions, the optimistic nature of planners’ forecasts changes. When-where-how 
planners, who focused nearly exclusively on steps, had much more optimistic expectations for 
when their Christmas shopping would end, and as a re ult they experienced an exacerbated 
planning fallacy. In contrast, if-then planners, who directed their attention more intently at how 
to cope with obstacles, were less optimistic. They predicted that they would finish their shopping 
nearly three days later than when-where-how planners, r sulting in a reduction in the planning 
fallacy. 
 The relationship between plan content and forecasts. Thus, we have seen evidence that 
plan format changes the situations and actions that participants consider, and that that plan 
format changes the bias in task completion judgments by influencing the optimistic nature of 
forecasts. In this final set of analyses, we aimed to emonstrate a mediated relationship between 





evidence of such a relationship. Here we tested a mediation model including between plan type 
as the independent variable, the proportion of obstacle-coping plans that were generated by 
participants as the mediator, and participants’ predictions for when they would complete their 
shopping as the dependent variable. Because no-plan control participants did not form plans and 
free-plan control participants only formed one plan (thus making their proportion not directly 
comparable to if-then and when-where-how planners), we excluded these participants from this 
analysis and focused our attention upon the difference between if-then and when-where-how 
planners. A mediation model using Hayes’  PROCESS macro with when-where-how planners as 
the comparison group (Hayes 2009; Hayes and Preacher 2014) revealed that while if-then plans 
did increase the proportion of obstacles participants included in their plans15 (β = .39, t(113) = 
10.04, p < .001), there was no significant relationship between the proportion of obstacles and 
participants’ forecasts for when they would finish shopping (β = -1.71, t(112) = -1.40, p = .16). 
The indirect effect was not significant (β = -.6653, LLCI: -1.9040, ULCI: .2723) while the direct 
effect was significant (β = 2.07, t(112) = 2.99, p = .003). Thus, while setting an if-then plan did 
lead to a greater likelihood of planning for how to cope with obstacles and also less optimistic 
forecasts than setting a when-where-how plan, these are independent effects. The change in 
forecast optimism appears to be driven by a different component process to what we 
hypothesized. 
Discussion 
 In this study, we examined how setting different types of plans affects the planning 
fallacy. In line with our earlier findings, making a when-where-how plan naturally focused 
                                                 
 
15 We also used an arcsine-root transformation for the proportion of plans in this analysis because the proportion 





participants on steps to reach the goal, while setting an if-then plan guided participants to think 
about how to cope with obstacles. Consistent with past research, plans also changed the 
optimism, and in turn, the accuracy of participants’ forecasts for when they would complete an 
important task (Buehler and Griffin 2003; Peetz et al. 2010). First, we found that setting any plan 
is not sufficient to influence forecasts – participants who set plans with no guidance as to format 
made predictions that were no different from no-plan controls. Thus, it appears that the effect of 
forming plans on forecasts is not simply caused by an increased focus on future events as argued 
by Buehler and Griffin (2003). In other words, planning does not seem to solely shift participants 
toward a greater propensity to use an inside approach, focused on a single optimistic narrative for 
how goal pursuit will unfold. Rather, the type of plan that people form influences their 
expectations about the future. 
 Building upon the work of Peetz et al. (2010), who found that inducing participants to 
focus on the presence of obstacles led to less optimistic completion time forecasts, we expected 
that a similar result might emerge when participants set plans for how to cope with barriers to 
reaching their goal (however, we remained mindful that having a plan to deal with problems 
might also lend a sense that now one knows how to deal with problems, also creating a sense of 
optimism). Indeed, plan type did shift the forecasts that participants made. When-where-how 
participants expected to reach their goal earlier than if-then planners (which also made their 
forecasts more accurate) with the control conditions falling in between. 
 However, contrary to our expectations, these differences in forecast optimism and 
accuracy were not driven by the extent to which participants’ plans focused on obstacles versus 
steps. This result leaves an open book for the process underlying the effect of planning on 





plan format is driven by shifts in future focus or in the relative focus of steps versus obstacles, 






STUDY 3: EMOTION PREDICTIONS 
As with the other two types of judgments that we have examined here, in many cases 
individuals generate forecasts for their future feelings that are optimistic in nature. In order to 
predict their upcoming emotions, people also utilize an inside approach by simulating a narrative 
of how the situation will unfold, but that narrative is often too narrow, too incomplete, and too 
focused on the central details of the set of events that the individual thinks will happen (Dunning 
2007). However, events rarely unfold in exactly the manner we expect, and the emotional 
experience they bring about is often tempered by periph ral features that are part of the broader 
experience of life like other concurrent goals, social support/comparisons, etc., but that are 
typically not included in the experience of simulating how one will feel in the future (Buehler 
and McFarland 2001; Dunning 2007). 
For example, Buehler and McFarland (2001) argue that people are often inattentive to 
other possible outcomes (e.g., “What if I end up only exercising for half the time I expected?”) or 
qualifiers to their future emotional state (e.g., “What if I exercise for the amount of time in my 
goal but feel really physically ill afterwards?”), leading to predictions of more intense feelings. 
Indeed, they find that participants who adopted an inside approach of simulating the future 
generated more positive emotional forecasts for positive events and more negative emotional 
forecasts for negative events, compared to participants who were encouraged to predict their 
feelings by thinking about the past. Similarly, Liberman, Sagristano, and Trope (2002) use a 
Construal Level Theory lens to examine the impact of the completeness of people’s narratives 
upon their forecasts. They argue that when people are induced to think about the distant future, 
their representations of those events are simpler, mo e reflective of prototypical experiences, and 





near future. As such, distant future events are more likely to be simulated in a narrow manner 
(e.g. “After I exercise for the amount of time in my goal, I’ll feel fantastic about my 
accomplishment!”), while those in the near future should include more balanced interpretations 
reflecting a wider range of possibilities (e.g. “After I exercise for the amount of time in my goal, 
I’ll feel good about my accomplishment, but I’ll probably also feel discouraged because I still 
find it challenging to lift as much weight as I want to.”). Indeed, Liberman et al. found that 
predictions for close events – reflecting a more balanced, inclusive narrative – were less extreme 
and less prototypical than those for the distant future.  
To the extent that plans narrow or broaden the narrative that people use to make their 
forecasts of future feelings by decreasing or increasing the likelihood that they consider obstacles 
that hinder goal pursuit, they may also change the nature of those forecasts. Specifically, plans 
that narrow the forecast to focus more strongly on an idealized set of events – when-where-how 
plans – should lead to more extreme forecasts for futu e emotion. Conversely, if-then plans that 
broaden the focus of one’s narrative to include obstacles that would not have otherwise been 
considered should help the forecaster to recognize that multiple outcomes are possible and that 
the results of the goal do not occur in a vacuum, leading to more tempered predictions.16 
Participants and Method 
 Respondents were participants in the E! program described in Study 1 of this paper. We 
used the same inclusion criteria as in that study. However, some participants did not provide 
responses to the questions below, leaving 484 respondents available for analysis here. 
                                                 
 
16 However, as we acknowledged earlier in this paper, if-then plans focused on how to cope with obstacles may lend 
individuals a sense that they know how to overcome barriers and that the situation is well in hand. In this case, more 





 At the beginning of the E! study, participants were randomly assigned to one of four 
conditions as described in Study 1 and they formed plans using the prompts described above. 
Following the planning intervention, participants answered questions about their expectations for 
their future feelings. Using a 7-point scale (0 = not at all, 3 = moderately, 6 = very much), 
participants predicted how satisfied, happy, and fulfilled they would feel if they were to achieve 
their E! exercise goal for the following week, and how much they would feel regretful, 
determined to improve in the future, and wishing they could change the situation if they did not 
achieve their goal. 
Results 
 First, we averaged the positive items (α = .91) and negative items (α = .85) into two index 
variables. The following analyses control for goal intentions as described in Study 1 to account 
for heterogeneity in participants’ commitment to their goals. Recall that our prediction was that 
when-where-how planners, who are focused on a narrowe , more untempered narrative, would 
predict more intense future positive and negative emotions. Conversely, we expected if-then 
participants, whose plans encourage the consideration of obstacles that would otherwise be 
ignored in participants’ scenario construction, to have more muted and less extreme expectations 
for future emotions. 
An ANOVA with planned contrasts revealed that, as predicted, when-where-how 
planners expected to feel more extreme positive emotions (MWWH = 5.93, SEWWH = .08) upon 





SECTRL = .08).17 This difference was significant (F(1, 479) = 4.66, p = .03). However, contrary to 
our predictions, if-then participants’ predictions for positive emotion (MIT = 5.80, SEIT = .09) did 
not vary from those made by respondents in either the control (F(1,479) = 1.13, p = .29) or 
when-where how plan conditions (F(1,479) = 1.07, p = .30). Turning to negative emotions, we 
observed no differences across conditions, again contrary to our expectations. Neither when-
where-how planners (MWWH = 4.95, SEWWH = .11) nor if-then planners (MIT = 5.07, SEIT = .12) 
made more extreme predictions than control participants (MCTRL = 4.96, SECTRL = .11; FWWH-
CTRL(1,479) = .004, p = .95; FIT-CTRL(1,479) = .46, p = .50). If-then and when-where-how 
planners’ predictions also did not differ from each ot er (F(1,479) = .55, p = .46).  
Discussion 
 In this study, we predicted that plans would change the intensity of participants’ predicted 
emotions by narrowing or broadening the narratives th y use to make the forecast. While we 
observed some preliminary evidence of this phenomenn – when-where-how plans did lead to 
more extreme predictions of positive emotion as hypothesized – we did not observe the predicted 
effects for predictions about negative feelings nor for predictions made by if-then planners. In 
hindsight, some modifications to our stimuli and context may have helped to achieve a more 
conclusive result. First, a more comprehensive list of emotions would have been ideal to tap the 
range of feelings people may predict that they willfeel. While we combined positive and 
negative emotions into indices, it is possible thatey did not represent the full set of feelings 
experienced by participants. We also recognize that the states of being “determined to improve 
                                                 
 
17 The means reported above are the estimated marginal means including the influence of the goal intentio s 
covariate. Unadjusted means are as follows: MWWH-POS = 5.97, SDWWH-POS = 1.04; MIT-POS = 5.83, SDIT-POS = 1.07; 
MCTRL-POS = 5.64, SDCTRL-POS = 1.15; MWWH-NEG = 5.00, SDWWH-NEG = 1.46; MIT-NEG = 5.11, SDIT-NEG = 1.25; MCTRL-





the future” and “wishing one could change the situat on” are associated with emotion but are not 
a pure representation of such. Second, participants should have been given the opportunity to rate 
the entire range of emotions for failing to meet the goal, meeting the goal, and exceeding the 
goal, as the current setup does not allow for the possibility that individuals may feel ambivalent 
or that they may feel positive emotions after failure (e.g. “I almost got there!”) or negative 
emotions after success (e.g. “I could have done bett r”; “Sure, I exercised for 40 minutes but my 
friend worked out for an hour,” etc.). Third, a context where we can manipulate the prospect of 







In this paper, we examined how setting different types of plans changes the nature of how 
people make predictions about future goal pursuit. In three domains, we found that the type of 
plan people set often matters. Based on prior literature, we expected that predictions for future 
events, for task duration, and for future emotion would be underlaid by a common tendency to 
adopt an “inside strategy” – in other words, generating forecasts by constructing narratives or 
scenarios by simulating the events and actions that are expected to happen. While this method is 
commonly used and easy to implement, people have a well-documented tendency to construct 
their narratives in an incomplete manner, often focusing on a straightforward, idealized path to 
the objective that does not reflect alternate outcomes, contingencies, or the complexities of actual 
goal pursuit. By increasing the likelihood that indivi uals would consider how to cope with 
barriers, we expected that if-then plans would broaden people’s narratives to also include 
considerations of paths outside a simple, easy progression from start to finish. In doing so, we 
expected that if-then planners’ forecasts would better reflect reality, with less optimism. 
However, we acknowledged the possibility that the opposite may also be true – should if-then 
plans turn out to be too restrictive or lend people a sense that dealing with barriers is well in hand 
(“OK, now I know how to overcome these problems”), we foresaw that if-then plans may 
actually lead to greater optimism and a poorer reflection of reality.  
The direction of our results varied depending on the type of prediction that was at hand. 
Our results provide a compelling basis for further inquiry, but more work is needed. We will 
summarize our findings below and then elaborate upon adjustments to theory that may help to 





First, we examined how plans guide people to be more or less accurate to predict the 
situations that will occur in the future and whether they will carry out their intended action. We 
found that participants who set when-where-how plans that were focused on enacting steps were 
more accurate compared to if-then plans centered on copi g with obstacles. When-where-how 
planners were more likely to include scenarios in their plans that actually arose, and they were 
more likely to have carried out their specified action when given the opportunity. Importantly, 
this effect was qualified by an interaction with task experience; figuring out the road ahead 
should be most challenging for those who have seldom travelled it before. Indeed, the cross-plan 
differences we observed were driven by novices, with cross-plan differences in accuracy 
dissipating for more experienced individuals. Thus, if-then plans did not appear to broaden 
participants’ predictions in this context – they did not lead to a better sense of what to expect. 
Rather, their probabilistic nature seems to have led to participants being more likely to expect 
events that did not happen and actions that were not carried out. 
Second, we demonstrated that plans also influence people’s forecasts for how long a 
valued but somewhat arduous task – Christmas shopping – will take to complete. Here, we built 
on prior work showing that setting plans leads to more optimistic forecasts versus considering 
the presence of obstacles, which make forecasts less optimistic. We add to this body of findings 
by revealing that the type of plan matters to how people make predictions. Simply setting any 
plan is not enough – participants given no guidance on how to set their plans set forecasts that 
were no different than individuals assigned to a no-plan control. Rather, consistent with previous 
findings, when-where-how plans make forecasts more optimistic. Participants who formed this 
type of plan predicted that they would be done with their shopping earlier than both control 





condition. In turn, these optimistic forecasts meant when-where-how planners were also less 
accurate, since actual completion times did not vary ac oss conditions. As described above, we 
expected these differences in forecasts to be driven by changes in the content of participants’ 
plans – specifically, the likelihood that they considered obstacles – but we did not find evidence 
that plan content mediates changes in forecasts driving the planning fallacy, suggesting that 
another process is at work. 
Third, we examined predictions for future emotion. Based on findings showing that 
generating narratives by simulating the future using a narrow, inside approach led to predictions 
of more intense future feelings, we expected that when-where-how planners would show this 
effect. Conversely, by incorporating how to cope with potential obstacles, if-then planners 
should recognize that the path to goal achievement rarely unfolds in an idealized manner and that 
the potential paths to the goal are equifinal. While we observed preliminary evidence of this 
hypothesis – when-where-how planners did indeed report that they expected to feel more intense 
positive emotion – results for if-then planners andfor negative emotions were inconclusive. 
Theoretical refinements 
 We predicted that plans would change the scope of the narratives that people form to 
make forecasts using an inside strategy. By concentrati g people on steps to reach the goal, 
when-where-how plans should intensify the focus on a narrow, idealized path and lead to more 
optimistic, less accurate forecasts. In contrast, we expected that if-then plans, by focusing 
individuals more intently on how to cope with obstacles, would broaden the simulations used to 
generate forecasts, leading to predictions that are less optimistic and a better reflection of reality. 
Our results in Study 1 do not conform to this pattern: when-where-how planners were better 





the right reason: plan content did not mediate the link between plan type and forecasts. Study 3 
provides supportive but preliminary data for the role f planning in influencing forecasts of 
future emotion. 
Thus, some adjustment to the theory seems beneficial. One possibility is that if-then and 
when-where-how plans still change the tenor of people’s forecasts generated upon the basis of an 
“inside strategy” narrative, but they do not do so by influencing the breadth of content (i.e., the 
relative focus on steps versus obstacles). Rather than broadening people’s predictive narrative by 
encouraging them to think about obstacles, the more c ntingent nature of the if-then plan may 
lead to the recognition by forecasters that multiple paths are possible, the future is uncertain, and 
any scenario that is constructed is necessarily incomplete. Conversely, by focusing individuals 
on a seemingly straightforward path that seems feasible, when-where-how plans may reinforce 
certainty that one’s goal pursuit will be more likey to proceed in the way that is planned. In 
other words, different types of plans may influence for casts by changing the answer to the 
question, “How sure am I that I know what will happen?” 
To elaborate, let us return to the nature of the prompts themselves. Consider the fact that 
if-then plans begin with “if,” which is in and of itself a recognition that circumstances are 
somewhat stochastic, control is lower, and that there often exists the necessity to react to 
situations that arise from factors beyond one’s ownvolition. One often has to wait for the right 
conditions to act, and sometimes those conditions are unpredictable. In contrast, by asking 
participants to lay out steps they will take, when-where-how plans reinforce the idea that the 
planner is in control of the eventual set of events that will happen in the future.  
This varying sense of certainty in the quality or inclusiveness of one’s expected narrative 





Study 1, where we evaluated whether participants’ plans reflected the set of events that actually 
arose. If-then participants who feel less certain about what will happen in the future may have 
been motivated to include more unconventional or creative events/actions in their plans to enact 
“just in case” they are off-target about how the future will unfold. If these unconventional events 
have a lower probability of actually occurring, the if-then planner’s overall level of accuracy for 
predicting what will happen will be reduced.  
Similarly, for the completion time estimates in Study 2, the relative sense of certainty 
created by the structure of the when-where-how planm y have reinforced those participants’ 
confidence that they can accurately predict the events to come, leading to more bullish 
predictions for when the goal will be completed. Conversely, if-then planners with more 
uncertainty about their ability to accurately see into the upcoming haze of mall visits, gift lists, 
and sale tags should be more conservative in their for casts, which is what we observed. The 
control condition, which yielded results similar to if-then plans, may reflect the importance of 
considering people’s base levels of uncertainty toward the situation. While people are typically 
optimistic in their forecasts when left to their own devices to form them, they are still “situated 
optimists” and their forecasts are bounded by their underlying evaluation of the situation (Armor 
and Taylor 1998). For most people, Christmas shopping is an inherently unpredictable 
experience – “Will the store have the item I need,” “Will Uncle Paul really like those socks I got 
him,” “How will I stick to my budget,” etc. – and it is possible that participants in this context 
naturally simulated the process of shopping with much of the same focus as if-then planners. In a 






This perspective also seems to fit with existing literature on prediction and 
overconfidence. For example, being reminded that a situ tion can occur in many different ways 
and that knowing which version of events will occur is difficult to anticipate leads participants to 
generate wider confidence intervals around their predictions (Griffin, Dunning, and Ross 1990), 
and calibration improves when they are prompted to als consider information that is contrary to 
their initial forecast (Koriat, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff 1980; Hoch 1985; Newby-Clark et al. 
2000). We leave evaluation of this hypothesis to fuure investigation. 
A second theoretical direction may be the consideration of how plans are likely to affect 
participants’ regulatory focus orientation. In Chapter 1, we argued that if-then plans are likely to 
prompt a prevention focus while when-where-how plans should guide individuals toward a 
promotion focus. This theoretical framing also accommodates the results of Studies 1 and 2. 
First, consider the results of Study 1, where we evaluated whether participants’ plans accurately 
reflected the events that actually occurred. Prior w rk has shown that individuals with a 
promotion focus are primarily concerned with ensuring they take actions that strive toward gains, 
and seeking to avoid errors of omission – in other words, making sure that one does not fail to 
actually do what one has intended. Conversely, a prevention focus prompts actions that result in 
non-losses and guard against errors of commission – n other words, ensuring that one avoids 
doing something that one did not intend to do (Crowe and Higgins 1997). Recall that in Study 1, 
when-where-how participants were significantly more lik ly to formulate plans which they had 
the opportunity to enact, and they were also more likely to carry out those plans compared to if-
then planners. This pattern is consistent with when-where-how participants being more 
concerned with seeking to avoid acts of omission – perhaps they were more likely to select plans 





adopt an optimistic or a pessimistic outlook when forecasting, with promotion-focused 
individuals expressing a preference for optimistic forecasts and a greater tendency to make them, 
and prevention focus leading people toward a pessimi tic outlook (Hazlett, Molden, and Sackett 
2011). This orientation fits with the general findigs of Study 2, where when-where-how 
participants generated significantly more optimistic forecasts for finishing their Christmas 
shopping than did if-then participants. We are currently further examining the role of regulatory 
focus as a mechanism for the influence of plans on prediction. 
Conclusion 
 People spend a great deal of time, effort, and resources forming predictions about how 
their future goal pursuit will unfold. For instance, they try to forecast what will happen and how 
they will act in the future, how long tasks will take to complete, and how they will feel along the 
way. Forecasts are also often closely linked with plans – our expectations of the future serve as 
inputs to planning and are shaped by the planned means that we select to pursue goals. 
Unfortunately, people are often biased in their forecasts. They fail to fully account for the 
realities of the situation, which often leaves them unduly optimistic. In this paper, we examined 
the relationship between planning and forecasting and explored the extent to which different 
types of plans which have been found in the literature change people’s predictions about the 
future; we did so with the aim that better plans should hopefully lead to better forecasts, and vice 
versa. While our results were mixed, they provide a foundation to continue the objective of 







TABLE 2.1: WINSORIZED VALUES FOR CHRISTMAS SHOPPING  PREDICTIONS, 






Mean 18.73 22.22 -3.55 
Minimum / Maximum 9.71 / 52.71 12.58 / 43.79 -29.88 / 30.83 
1st percentile 10.51 13.67 -24.10 
99th percentile 30.21 43.40 9.06 
Winsorized mean 18.65 22.22 -3.63 
 
Note: These values are coded as dates in December. For example, December 18 at approximately 
4:50 pm is coded 18.70. The time is represented as the proportion of the 24h period. Thus, .70 
days = [16 hours i.e. 4:00 pm + (50min/hour = .833 hours)]/24 hours/day]. 52.71 represents 
January 21 at approximately 5:00 pm (December 31 + 2 .71 days). Minor differences of a few 






TABLE 2.2: MEAN PREDICTED TASK COMPLETION DATES, AC TUAL 







No-plan control 18.76 (4.31) 21.82 (2.58) -3.05 (4.50) 
Free-plan control 18.09 (3.72) 21.53 (2.92) -3.41 (.34) 
If-then 19.89 (4.04) 22.36 (2.96) -2.46 (3.71) 
When-where-how 17.07 (4.25) 22.50 (4.51) -5.43 (5.33) 
 






APPENDIX 2.1: PLANNING INSTRUMENTS AND MEASURES - STUDY 2 





Hybrid Participants specify two categories for facilitative actions, then asked to 
elaborate on 1-2 specific actions per category: 
 
 
Participants then specify two obstacle coping strategies: 
 
Participants then arrange all actions in order of anticipated completion. 
Free-plan Participants given a text field and asked to “make a plan for how you 
will act.” 
No-plan control Participants not asked to think about planning 
 
In addition to the measures described above and in the main body of the paper, in Wave 1 





them to finish their shopping, a thought listing about how they arrived at their shopping forecast, 
the likelihood and intentions that they would complete their shopping in time, an attention check, 
and demographics. In Wave 2, participants completed m asures about the judged extent of their 
planning (adapted from Sniehotta et al. 2005), their c rtainty about completion times, and scales 
on elaboration on potential outcomes (Nenkov et al. 2008) and trait propensity to plan (Lynch Jr. 








Understanding goal pursuit is an essential part of understanding consumer behavior. A 
great deal of the actions that we undertake in our r le as consumers are driven by the intention to 
achieve valued consumption, self-control, and experiential goals (Bagozzi and Dholakia 1999). 
However, people often experience a gap between their int ntions to perform (or avoid) goal-
consistent behaviors and actual behavioral outcomes. They miss the opportunity to take the stairs 
instead of the elevator to work toward a fitness goal, they go to parties instead of hitting the 
books, and they are not mindful that long lines andcrowds are likely to put a snag in their 
holiday shopping excursions. 
Forming plans has been frequently proposed in the literature as a way for people to 
overcome the intention-behavior gap by strengthening the link between situational cues in which 
action is desirable and a pre-specified behavior that can then be executed without the need to 
deliberate in the moment. In doing so, plans help pople get started along the road to goal 
pursuit, shield themselves from distractions, and overcome bad habits (Gollwitzer 1999).  
Indeed, much research has shown that plans often work ell, yielding impressive patterns 
of effects in a variety of contexts (Gollwitzer and Sheeran 2006), and they have been proposed as 
an ideal means to help improve people to achieve goals in the consumer behavior domain 
(Gollwitzer and Sheeran 2009). Their intuitive appeal for consumers, managers, and researchers 





inexpensive way to promote goal achievement not only within the confines of the lab but also in 
“real” consumption and purchase domains. 
However, recent work (including the work presented in this dissertation) tells somewhat 
of a more nuanced and complex story about the effectiveness of plans when they are used in the 
contexts that often matter to marketers. Sometimes plans work well, but sometimes plans do little 
to help people to achieve goals, and sometimes they can even be counterproductive (e.g. Bayuk 
et al. 2010; Skår et al. 2011; Dalton and Spiller 2012; Townsend and Liu 2012). Plans that do 
little to help consumers to act in ways that help them to achieve goals are a suboptimal use of 
resources, time, and effort, but relatively little work has examined potential shortfalls in plan 
effectiveness. In order to realize the potential of planning in a consumer context, it is critical that 
we understand the processes governing how plans influence consumption-type behaviors, with 
the intent of designing and implementing interventio s that are more consistent, reliable, and 
effective. 
In the two essays of this dissertation, I presented two sets of findings aimed at 
contributing to our understanding of how plans drive processes that help and hinder real goal 
pursuit. In Chapter 1, I examined how two types of plans that have been used rather 
interchangeably in the literature – “if-then” plans and “when-where-how” plans – give rise to 
processes influencing goal pursuit over time. I started with a somewhat puzzling finding – 
consistent with recent literature showing the drawbcks of planning, these interventions appeared 
to not be helping people to achieve their goals. A critical question, then, was why. First, I 
demonstrated that plans are not alike in terms of the content that they generate. Building upon 
the distinction found in the health psychology literature between plans for coping with obstacles 





naturally shift participants’ focus between these two ypes of means. If-then plans prompted a 
greater attention toward coping plans, while when-where-how plans encouraged the development 
of facilitative steps to reach the goal.  
In two field studies, I then revealed the implications of this shift in thought by examining 
how both types of plans work over time. By inducing a reater emphasis on coping with 
problems, if-then plans break people away from their natural tendency to think deeply about 
steps, but at the same time lock them into a less-fl xible conception of how they are acting 
toward the goal. As a result, when if-then planners ask, “How am I doing,” they report doing a 
worse job at acting in ways that help them to achieve the goal, compared to a no-plan control 
condition. This leads them to feel regret and to change their expectations and actions for the 
future. Experience also plays a critical role – regret can be motivating for those who have 
successfully pursued the goal many times before, but can harm goal pursuit for people who are 
relative novices. The implications of these process findings are important. By helping beginners 
to plan like those who are more experienced – for example, by guiding them to think about 
situations and actions that are more likely to occur, or by harnessing the motivating role of regret 
along with a learning rather than a performance orintation – there exists the prospect to help 
planners to develop plans that better propel them toward their goals. 
In Chapter 2, I examined planning from a different perspective: prediction. In order to 
plan, people have to forecast the types of situations they will encounter and the feasibility, 
effectiveness, and desirability of their intended actions. Ideally, better forecasts and more 
effective plans should go hand-in-hand. Interventions that help people to correctly anticipate 
future events should lead to better preparation and action execution when those circumstances 





likely to divert attention and resources away from important events and actions, increasing the 
probability that performance will be reduced. For example, a consumer with a fitness goal who is 
distracted by figuring out how to cope with exercising in bad weather despite sunny skies would 
seem to be less prepared and likely to perform optimally than another exerciser focused on 
laying out strategies for situations that actually do occur. I studied how planning interventions 
influence forecasts from three perspectives.  
In Study 1, I explored whether if-then plans or when-where-how plans are better at 
helping people to consider situations and actions that better reflect reality. In other words, which 
type of plan contained more situations and actions that actually happened during goal pursuit? 
Indeed, it seems likely that a plan will yield the b st preparation to pursue the goal when 
planners correctly predict the set of circumstances that they will encounter and the corresponding 
actions that are feasible and desirable to execute. Otherwise, one risks being caught off guard by 
unexpected problems or missing opportunities to move t ward the goal. Here, the obstacle-
focused nature of the if-then format led participants to create plans that were more narrow – 
these planners reported fewer opportunities to act and less success at executing their actions as 
they had expected, compared to when-where-how planners. This difference was particularly 
evident for novices, underscoring the recurring andcomplex role of the relationship between 
planning and experience with the goal. 
In Study 2, I examined how plans influence forecasts for how long a task will take to 
complete. Past work on the planning fallacy – a persistent bias whereby people routinely 
underestimate task duration – has shown that plans about when, where, and how action will 
occur lead to more optimistic forecasts (Buehler and Griffin 2003). People often tend to make 





out an expected set of events that is overly simplistic and idealistic, rather than an “outside” set 
of inputs based on past experiences, base rates, etc. (Kahneman and Lovallo 1993; Dunning 
2007). Borrowing from a familiar cliché, planners ae more likely to simulate a set of events 
where “all will go according to plan” and neglect to think about potential problems, which leads 
to more optimistic forecasts. While feeling optimistic may sometimes be functional and facilitate 
goal pursuit in the face of challenge, optimism canalso hinder goal pursuit by causing people to 
be ignorant or less worried about threats and undermining the corresponding need to act 
(Weinstein 1982; Schwarzer 1998). This latter “dark side” to optimism may lead individuals to 
believe that goal pursuit will be swift, postponing action, shifting attention to other 
responsibilities, and causing a lack of time to complete required tasks or increased costs due to 
delays. For example, one can easily imagine a consumer trying to pay off a loan for a large 
purchase like a house or a car and optimistically predicting, “Everything will be fine, I can 
definitely get this paid off by the end of the summer…I can treat myself to that new TV,” while 
someone less optimistic might think, “This is going to take me a long time, probably until late 
autumn. I’d better get started right away.” 
However, what if the type of plan that was formed l people to be more likely to 
consider obstacles? Would that reduce forecasters’ d pendence on idealized, “inside perspective” 
narratives and make their forecasts less optimistic, thus reducing the planning fallacy? The 
results of Study 2 are a first step in answering that question. First, I showed that setting any type 
of plan is not sufficient to induce changes in the planning fallacy – participants who set a plan 
with no guidance on format performed no differently than those who set no plan at all. However, 
the type of plan that people generated did affect their forecasts. Replicating past research, when-





turn, if-then plans reduced that optimism compared to when-where-how planners, but contrary to 
expectations, they did not change their optimism significantly compared to control. Similarly, if-
then planners were more accurate in their forecasts than when-where-how planners, but neither 
group differed significantly from control. Unexpectdly, changes in plan content did not mediate 
the relationship between plan type and forecasts, suggesting that another process is at work; 
further examination into regulatory focus/fit or how plans change participants’ confidence in the 
accuracy or precision of their forecasts (e.g. perhaps the more contingent nature of if-then plans 
leads participants to believe their forecasts will be less accurate/precise while when-where-how 
planning leads to more confidence due to the presence of at least one way forward) may be 
promising.  
In Study 3, I examined the link between planning and prediction for future emotion. As 
described above, past work has shown that people often forecast their feelings by constructing 
narratives of upcoming events; he incomplete nature of these narratives can also lead to more 
extreme predictions of emotion – by focusing on a narrower range of possible outcomes and 
events, expectations for future feelings are less likely to be qualified by factors that are likely to 
temper one’s evaluation (Buehler and McFarland 2001; Liberman et al. 2002). For example, a 
runner might consider the emotional “high” he gets from finishing a race but fail to appreciate 
the possibility of those positive feelings being moderated by physical pain from shin splints or 
his relative standing on the leaderboard. Because they are more likely to consider obstacles that 
would otherwise be unconsidered, I expected that if-then planners would generate more muted 
expectations of their future feelings. Conversely, to the extent that when-where-how plans 
generated a focus on an idealized narrative for how g al pursuit would unfold, I expected 





results from this study yielded little evidence in support of these predictions. While when-where-
how planners did report that they expected to feel gr ater future positive emotions compared to 
control, no significant findings emerged for if-then planners. Predictions for negative emotions 
also did not yield significant results. I am hopeful that with methodological refinements 
(including a context where success or failure can be manipulated), future research will yield 
more answers to the question of how plans change the prediction of future feelings. 
Overall, then, the influence of plans on prediction is a mixed picture. While these 
findings offer some evidence that plans influence the ways in which people make forecasts, they 
are a first step in developing our understanding. To that end, I presented a number of 
methodological and theoretical refinements that I hope will serve as a foundation for future 
research in this area.  
Together, the findings from Chapters 1 and 2 reveal that as consumers, managers, and 
researchers, we should be mindful of the types of planning tools that we use, evaluating their 
effect both in terms of the types of situations andctions that participants include and at the level 
of psychological processes.  Recently, in their comprehensive review of the planning literature, 
Hagger and Luszczynska (2014) noted that, among other priorities, future research should work 
to delineate the effects of varied types of planning interventions and to evaluate additional 
mediating and moderating processes underlying planning. This work provides a contribution to 
that aim. Further, there emerges a number of practical recommendations. We should be cognizant 
of the type of action that each type of plan evokes – how to enact steps or cope with obstacles – 
and consider which is more critical for the goal context at hand. We should also be aware that if-
then plans can be inflexible in some conditions, leading people to recognize deficiencies in goal 





used by novices who may find it difficult to recognize future obstacles. As such, interventions 
like additional guidance on possible scenarios or the use of mental contrasting in combination 
with implementation intentions (mental contrasting i volves thinking about a desired future 
outcome and contrasting it with barriers that currently exist to hinder progress toward that 
outcome; e.g. Adriaanse et al. 2010) may help planners to have a better view of impediments that 
lie ahead. Further, pairing plans with interventions designed to frame goal pursuit as an 
opportunity to learn over time rather than as a reflection of one’s ability may also prove useful to 
turn regret into a positive force for motivation. We are currently testing such ideas. 
Overall, it seems that planning currently occupies an uncertain role in helping consumers 
to regulate their goal-directed behavior in complex s ttings with real, consequential goals. While 
existing work establishes a solid foundation and points to much potential to enact behavior 
change using these interventions, many questions remain about their consistency and reliability 
in the field. From a research perspective, this is encouraging, as the area continues to present 
many avenues to craft planning tools that are more useful for consumers and managers alike. I 
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